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ABSTRACT

The impact of religion on congressional politics is a question that is asked
frequently, yet most answers I have found are, in my opinion, inadequate in accurately
evaluating such an impact. This project has shown the influence that religion has on
members of the House of Representatives through religion’s effect on cosponsorship
patterns. I have shown that both members’ denominational affiliation and their religious
salience are significant across multiple legislative categories.
In this thesis I have redefined the measurement of religion when considering its
impact on congressional politics and broadened the scope of the question. Whereas
researchers previously sought to determine how members’ denomination affects their
support or opposition to abortion-related legislation, I have considered the abortion
question, yet added a dimension of religiosity to consider the effect of religiosity along
with denomination, and applied such statistical models to non-morality politics.
My research shows that both denomination and religiosity are significant across
legislative categories in predicting cosponsorship trends of such legislation. The
significance of these relationships are intriguing as the public trends toward preferring a
more clear separation between church and state, yet my models show that members are
still influenced by their religious affiliation and religious salience.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The notion of separating the church from the state has long been supported by
Americans, and is often believed to be a constitutional decree, yet such an interpretation
of the First Amendment’s religion clauses remains contested. The infamous phrase was
coined by Thomas Jefferson in 1802 in a letter he wrote to the Danbury Baptists
suggesting that a “wall be built to separate the Church and the State.” Americans tend to
be hesitant when considering the influence religion has or could have in politics as this
wall becomes a sort of ideal, yet few would contend that the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment bar members of Congress from letting their personal religious beliefs
influence their political decision making. Through this thesis I will illustrate how
religion is pervasive in the political arena and the impact it has on congressional politics.
Historically, there have been two dominant and competing approaches as how
best to understand the influence that religion has in politics, the first being an
ethnoreligious perspective and the second a theological restructuring perspective. The
ethnoreligious perspective is drawn from Emile Durkheim’s understanding of religion as
a “social phenomenon, emphasizing affiliation with religious groups as the means by
which religion shapes political responses.” Inspired by Max Weber, the theological
restructuring perspective, on the other hand, sees religion “embodied in beliefs,
emphasizing their role in shaping political attitudes and behavior.” A modern
understanding to religion’s role in politics, however, combines the two perspectives: it
“views religion as embodying belonging, beliefs, and behavior, with all three influencing
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the political life.” (Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009, 5) Consistent with this modern
perspective I will illustrate that religious belonging and beliefs influence representatives’
political behavior and that the wall that many think separates the church from the state is
quite permeable.
Through my research I show that religion is not limited to privately held beliefs,
but rather that such beliefs are pervasive in the political sphere and that they play a
consequential role in the decision-making processes of members of Congress. I
demonstrate the influence and impact religion has on Congressional politics by studying
the behaviors of members of Congress in their bill sponsorship in light of their selfreported religion, theological orientation, and religious behaviors. In measuring religion
and religious commitment, I predicted that members who adhere to a more
traditional/fundamentalist religion and those who exhibit higher levels of religious
commitment would be more likely to act in accordance with the denominational stance
on an issue and would cosponsor bills regarding such issues more frequently than those
who adhere to a more modernist religion, simply cite a religion, or provide no response to
the question of religious orientation.
The scope of my research is limited to the House of Representatives in the 114th
Congress (2015-2016) so as to allow for extensive research on 435 members and to
obtain accurate and current biographical profiles. I obtained representatives’ selfreported religious identity from the biographies of members of Congress in the CQ Press
Congress Collection database. This data was used as a baseline categorical independent
variable that was sorted into two additional variables.
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I further sorted representatives by their religious affiliation or denomination to
create a measure of theological orientation. As Kellstedt and Green argue, “Individual
affiliation with a religious group or organization is central to a full understanding of the
effects of religion on politics,” and therefore cannot be ignored when studying the impact
of representatives’ religion on their political behavior (Kellstedt and Green 1993, 53). I
determined denominational categories using methods similar to those of Elizabeth Anne
Oldmixon (2005) in her research in Uncompromising Positions: God, Sex, and the U.S.
House of Representatives. In this work Oldmixon divides representatives’ religious
orientation into five categories: Fundamentalists and Nontraditional Conservatives,
Mainline Protestants, Black Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jewish, Liberal Protestants,
and Other small groups (121). Studying denominational alignment is significant in the
study of religion’s involvement in politics due to the “difference in belief, practice, and
commitment” that can be found within a denominational association “even for
individuals with nominal religiosity” (Kellstedt and Green 1993, 55). As opposed to
simply grouping representatives based on their listed denomination I discerned the
general theology of each denomination in terms of their traditionalist or modernist
theological orientation and classify each representative into one of the five
aforementioned categories. I used the data from the CQ Congressional Collection
biographies to sort representatives, but I also used more detailed descriptions of religious
affiliation from official Congressional Directory biographies in addition to members’
biographies on their personal websites to determine more specifically what church or
faction of a denomination a member aligns with. The denominational or theological
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variable will classify members of Congress according to their religious beliefs, yet I
contend that there is another equally useful variable to understand religion’s impact on
congressional politics.
In addition to sorting by denominational group or theological orientation I
categorized each representative’s religion in terms of his or her religious commitment or
religiosity. I used Congressional Directory and website biographies to form a measure
religiosity. Religious commitment proved to be the most difficult variable to
operationalize, yet I expected that it would be associated strongly with representatives’
choices in the political arena. Authors who study religion’s influence in Congress tend to
limit their measure of religion to the self-reported affiliation listed in the Congressional
Directory, as that is the most easily accessible source of religious affiliation. Scholars
stipulate that this common method of measuring religious affiliation is simplistic, yet
little has been done to improve this measure (Fastnow, Grant, and Rudolph 1999, 688).
When measuring levels of religiosity in the general public, polls frequently ask the
frequency of church attendance, yet this is not a question that has been asked of
Congress, so I am tasked with creating a different measure of religiosity. I measured
representatives’ religious commitment by recording if they mention their religion,
religious behavior, or house of worship in either their Congressional Directory or official
website biography. I then coded these descriptions of religious commitment on a scale
from no religious involvement aside from a nominal claim (found in the CQ
Congressional Collection), to holding a leadership position in a congregation or an
equivalent community. This scale is a four-point scale, with one indicating little religious
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involvement, two indicating formal membership in a religious organization, three
indicating evidence of active involvement in a religious organization, and four indicating
that a member holds a leadership position in a religious institution or organization.
I then illustrated the relationship between both denomination/theological
orientation and religious commitment and political behavior by analyzing these
independent variables in relation to a representative’s cosponsorship record. When
examining members of Congress’ positions on an issue, roll-call votes are the easiest
means for determining a positive or negative stance on such an issue, yet I—along with
several congressional scholars—argue that there is another measure that demonstrates
policy stance. The sponsorship or cosponsorship of a bill is a demonstration of a
representative’s deeper commitment to an issue as it is an indicator of dedication to a
cause. Bethany Blackstone and Elizabeth Oldmixon contend that the study of roll-call
votes is understandable due to the fact that it is through these votes that policy is made
(2015, 3), yet looking “upstream in the policy process,” as Barry Burden describes it, is a
better source to understand members’ priorities (2007, 8). Roll-call votes indicate where
policy is made, but cosponsorship and introduction of bills are where members’ agendas
are directly promoted. It is important to note, however, that the absence of a
cosponsorship is not necessarily an indication of an objection to a certain policy, yet this
measure is useful in understanding policies to which members have extreme dedication.
In determining which bills to study for cosponsors I have selected bills in four
categories of policy issues: abortion, religious freedom, gay rights, and treatment of
refugees. In order to ensure that there is substantial data to observe representatives’
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behavior I limited my search to include only bills and resolutions that originated in the
House and had 25 or more cosponsors. Carrying out this search has yielded roughly 40
bills that I will use to construct my dependent variables to study the relationship between
religion and congressional behavior, in terms of both theological orientation and
religiosity.
To measure the relationship between my dependent variables—measures of
representational behavior through (co)sponsorship—and independent variables—
measures of religious orientation and religiosity—I used Stata to generate descriptive
cross-tabulations to observe the overall impact that religion has on political behavior.
Additionally I conducted multivariate regression analyses to control for variables such as
party and religious makeup of a representative’s constituency and obtain results signaling
the effect and significance of religion’s role in representational behavior.
James Guth and Lyman Kellstedt (2005) conducted a similar sort of analysis of
religious commitment’s influence on congressional behavior for the 105th Congress, yet
little information was published as to the results of their study. I intend for my thesis to
serve as an updated and expanded version of the research they began. The goal of my
research is not necessarily attempting to predict how different denominations influence
behavior—as Guth and Kellstedt did—but rather to determine whether and how members
of Congress use religion in their decision-making processes, and understand how those
with a higher level of commitment to their religion in their private life manifest those
beliefs in their political life. Additionally, I examine both the role that religion may play
in congressional politics and the consequences of such a role.
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Through this thesis I describe the extent to which religion is a factor in
congressional politics, yet I expect that it is far more involved in shaping personal
decision than normative theories of a “high and impregnable” wall separating the Church
from the State might suggest (Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing).
The idea of a wall separating the church from the state stems from the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution, which decrees that “Congress shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Despite
debates persisting as to how involved the church can be in American politics, few would
hold that members of Congress must not let their religion influence their decision making
processes. The balance between how members of Congress exercise their personal
religious views and prevent the establishment of religion is often misunderstood, yet I
show that religion is influential in the United States Congress and should be accepted as
such so as to better understand political-decision making.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Academic interest in the effects of religion on congressional politics has grown in
recent years, yet the methods of analysis are still in need of refinement. When studying
the effects of religion on congressional behavior, scholars tend to emphasize either the
accuracy of their measure of religion or the extent to which they apply such a measure to
Congressional behavior—some limiting their application to roll-call votes, and others
extending it further. It is rare, however, for scholars to accomplish both sufficiently. In
this thesis I will attempt to achieve both goals: utilizing an accurate measure of religion—
namely religious salience—and applying such a measure to congressional behavior that
looks beyond roll-call votes on morality legislation. In order to improve upon existing
studies in this field I intend to more accurately measure the salience of religion for
representatives, look beyond morality politics to policies that are not inherently religious
in nature, and study behavior off of the floor of the House of Representatives. In this
chapter I will first discuss previous attempts at measuring religiosity and contexts in
which the influences of religion have been measured—and areas in which I argue the
study should be expanded. I will then consider the limits of measuring the impact of
religion purely in the context of roll-call votes. Lastly I will address the impact that a
member’s constituency might have in his or her representational behavior.

9
MEASURE OF RELIGIOSITY

Accurately measuring members of Congress’ religious salience, or religiosity, is
frequently regarded as the most difficult task of determining the relationship between
religion and politics. The level of difficulty posed by this daunting task often leads
scholars to simply accept the nominal religious affiliation reported by members of
Congress in the official Congressional Directory produced by the Joint Committee on
Printing (U.S. Government Publishing Office 2016), and to use this categorization as
their independent variable (Burden 2007, Cann 2009, Green and Guth 1991, Richardson
and Fox 1972, Wheatley 2010). Such a measure, however, leads to an oversimplification
of the nature of such a complex variable as religion.
The data provided on members’ religion in the Congressional Directory is selfreported and exceptionally generic. Members can report either a basic denominational
affiliation—such as “Baptist” or “Methodist”—or simply identification with a religion—
such as “Christian” or “Jewish.” Most scholars attempt to group responses into a more
manageable number of categories, but the process of grouping such generic responses
poses a number of difficulties for scholars. The denominational differences within
generic sects of Christianity, for example, could lead to drastically inaccurate grouping of
members of Congress as the differences within Baptist denominations vary greatly
despite being reported as the same in the Congressional Directory. Despite this caveat,
scholars still attempt to group representatives, either using region as a cue—to label a
Baptist as a Southern Baptist—or race—to discern that a member might be an African
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Methodist Episcopalian rather than simply a Methodist (Oldmixon 2009, 500). Such
categorization, however, is founded on gross assumptions that could lead to wildly
inaccurate results. The predicament scholars find themselves in, however, is that this is
the most efficient manner by which members’ religious affiliation can be understood.
Obtaining detailed data for every member of Congress, such as that of Peter Benson and
Dorothy Williams (1982), is an unrealistic task, yet one that would provide exceedingly
useful insight.
Benson and Williams completed the most detailed study of members’ religion in
their work, Religion on Capitol Hill (1982). Their in-depth study of the 96th Congress
(1979-1981) produced results on the religious beliefs and behaviors of 80 members of
Congress who were willing to participate in their questioning. The sort of information
obtained by these scholars proved to be useful to the study of religion and legislative
behavior, yet obtaining such detailed accounts for every Congress is not feasible. With
the information we are given, namely through self-reported biographies, academics are
forced to determine how best to formulate a measure of religious salience. Scholars have
adopted the methodology developed by James Guth and Lyman Kellstedt as a more
manageable means of obtaining data similar to that of Benson and Williams, as it serves
to both categorize members by their religious affiliation, or belonging, and measure the
behavior of representatives.
Guth and Kellstedt begin their attempts to define and measure members of
Congress’ religion by obtaining their self-reported religion from the Congressional
Directory (2005, 5), as many other scholars do (Richardson and Fox 1972, Green and
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Guth 1991, Burden 2007, Cann 2009, Wheatley 2010). Guth and Kellstedt, however,
begin the practice of defining religion as more than a self-reported answer to a survey.
They use the Congressional Directory as a starting point, but stipulate that answers found
in the database are vague and not very useful unless categorized further (2005, 8). They
look at members’ congressional and campaign websites to find information about
members’ local houses of worship, leadership positions in a parish, service on
committees in their house of worship, participation in teaching Sunday School, and
attendance patterns (2005, 5).
Once more specific information about a member of Congress’ religious behavior
is obtained, Guth and Kellstedt categorize denominations into eight subcategories:
Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, White Catholic, Hispanic Catholic, Jewish,
Black Protestant, Latter-day Saints, and Seculars (2005, 9). The practice of creating
denominational subcategories is not unique to Guth and Kellstedt, as Oldmixon, for
example, creates seven categories in which she groups representatives: Fundamentalists
and Nontraditional Conservatives, Mainline Protestants, Black Protestants, Roman
Catholics, Jewish, Liberal Protestants, and Other small groups (2005, 121). Categorizing
members based on denominational alignment is significant in the study of religion’s
involvement in politics due to the “difference in belief, practice, and commitment” that
can be found within a denominational association “even for individuals with nominal
religiosity” (Kellstedt and Green 1993, 55). Guth and Kellstedt, however, take one
additional step in their measure of religious salience that many other scholars neglect:
they place members of Congress on a scale of religious commitment.
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To understand the extent to which a member of Congress is committed to his or
her religion, Guth and Kellstedt compile cues from the Congressional Directory and
members’ websites to place them on a four-point scale of religious salience (2005, 10).
Guth and Kellstedt score members as follows: “no apparent religious involvement (1);
formal membership in a congregation, but no regular activity (2); frequent or regular
attendance at services (3); and leadership positions in a congregation and/or activity in
parachurch groups (4)” (2005, 10). This scale of religious commitment is what I find
most intriguing and useful for understanding the religious salience of members of
Congress.
Using only the information provided by representatives in the Congressional
Directory grossly oversimplifies the extent to which variance exists within commitment
to religion. When members of Congress can state that they are simply “Christian”
whereas others indicate a more specific denominational identity it poses challenges of
categorizing representatives into accurate denominational families. Oldmixon’s approach
of grouping representatives into denominational categories is helpful in understanding
aggregate behavior as it allows for observations based on group behavior and adherence
to doctrinal stances on policy issues, yet Guth and Kellstedt’s practice of obtaining more
specific information on each representative’s religious belonging and behavior prior to
categorizing is more useful in understanding members’ religious salience. The religious
salience measure provides means for understanding the effect of commitment to one’s
religion on representational behavior, and for observing the impact that a higher level of
commitment has on policy positions. Additionally, their religious commitment scale
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quantifies a vital component of the religion variable that many scholars neglect. For this
reason I will be adopting the denominational families Oldmixon uses, yet with the
amount of detail Guth and Kellstedt obtain to create as specific and accurate of a
religiosity variable as possible.

MORALITY POLITICS

Most readers would not find it surprising that religious beliefs are predictive of
representational behavior on traditional religious matters, such as abortion and gay rights,
yet I, and many scholars, argue that the more telling case of religion’s relationship to
representational behavior would be to study the effects outside of traditional religious
issues. Scholars often argue that the interesting phenomenon is not whether religion’s
influence can be observed in representatives’ voting patterns on religious issues, but
whether the influence of religion transcends traditional religious causes (Oldmixon 2009,
508). If religion is truly to have an influence on a member’s representational behavior
then it should be influential not only in issues such as “abortion, gay rights, prayer in
school, or support of the state of Israel” or other issues of morality politics, but rather in
the political sphere as a whole (Wheatley 2010, 3). Traditionally scholars have tended to
focus their research on such issues of morality (Richardson and Fox 1972; Fastnow,
Grant, and Rudolph 1999; Koopman 2009; Oldmixon and Hudson 2008), yet this trend
has begun to change in more recent analyses.
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Elizabeth Oldmixon describes morality politics as issues that involve the demand
for sin (2009, 503), and Douglas Koopman argues that the basis of morality politics is
that it redistributes values rather than economic reward (2009, 549). Either way one goes
about describing such legislative issues, morality politics is the policy arena that
constitutes a unique set of issues rooted in one’s ethical convictions. At the core of such
issues is a conflict over “fundamental values about which no consensus exists among
members of society” (Koopman 2009, 549).
Studying the relationship between religion and behavior on legislative issues
pertaining to issues of morality, or those that are considered traditionally religious, is
useful in understanding the loyalty one has to one’s own religious affiliation, yet does
little to illustrate the importance of one’s religion when making legislative decisions. To
see the full effect of religious salience it must be studied outside of the realms in which it
serves as a predictive variable to the relationship between religious affiliation and policy
stances. If I were to analyze representational behavior on traditional religious issues I
would in a sense be predicting religious behavior with religious beliefs—likely producing
results one would anticipate. Observing a correlation between religious members’
representational behavior on religious issues is not surprising, as one would expect
deeply held beliefs to influence policy decisions on such issues. Yet one can truly
observe the extent to which religion influences representational behavior when
considering the impact of religion on policy that transcends traditional religious issues. If
religion is truly a personal motivator in forming policy positions its impact ought to
transcend issues that are traditionally linked with religion. As I intend to test the
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relationship between my independent variable of religiosity and my dependent variable of
representational behavior, I must illustrate that the variables themselves are different and
not simply indicating the effect of religion on religion. I will accomplish this by
considering legislation outside the realm of traditional religious issues.
Many scholars have begun to approach the study of religion and politics from a
perspective outside of morality politics so as to see the true relationship between religion
and legislative decision-making. In a study on the propensity to engage in floor speeches,
Bethany Blackstone and Elizabeth Oldmixon consider the frequency of speeches given
on issues pertaining to cultural traditionalism, poverty and social welfare, and the role of
government (2015, 3). Such categorical variables could appear at first glance to fall into
the morality politics category, yet the specific issues that Blackstone and Oldmixon
studied are far more nuanced and removed from traditional religious stances. Issues such
as health care, immigration, education, budgets and debt, taxation, and intergovernmental
relations are the focus of this study as they allow the authors to observe the full impact of
members’ religion as it comes into competition with non-religious policy views. When
considering religion’s impact on legislators and their decision making, studying cases in
which religion is challenged by other policy positions indicates the extent to which
members uphold their commitment to their religious beliefs.
Oldmixon continues her study of religion outside the context of traditional
morality politics in her study on “Needs, norms and food policy in the U.S. House of
Representatives” with David Schecter (2011). In this piece the authors study the effect of
“partisanship, religion, and district need on legislative behavior pertaining to food policy”
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(2011, 597). Oldmixon and Schecter argue that the religious views of members of
Congress will influence legislative behavior pertaining to food-policy issues as unlike
“ascriptive characteristics, such as race and sex, religion…entails a set of values or
creedal admonitions for how one is supposed to live,” and therefore behave (599). They
once again cite Burden, as he argues that religion serves as an “internal cue” that will
affect behavior on any policy issues that “implicate religious creeds and community
interests” (Oldmixon and Schecter 2011, 599). Although food policy is not considered a
traditional issue of morality or an inherently religious issue, such as abortion or gay
rights, the authors claim that food policy is religious salient (597) as it “implicates
religious teaching” (601) through the lens of the social gospel that “traditionally animated
religious activism and political attitudes in America” (599). Despite the fact that the
scope of such a policy area falls outside the traditional religious dimension food issues
remain connected to religious causes. This connection leads Oldmixon and Schecter to
argue that religion will prove to influence legislator’s decision-making processes on food
issues (599).
In order to test their hypotheses, Oldmixon and Schecter studied the behavior of
representatives in regards to three bills: a bill that sought to expand government nutrition
programs, an appropriations bill that included a provision removing a food program, and
the specific amendment within the appropriations bill that would have cut funding from a
school-breakfast program. The amendment was defeated with a bipartisan supermajority,
with 59 votes in favor of the amendment—57 of those being Republican (2011, 600).
The authors found Catholics more likely than non-Catholics to oppose the amendment,
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yet they observed that Catholics behaved extremely similarly to white evangelical, black
Protestant, and mainline Protestant representatives when voting on the appropriations bill
and other nutrition-related pieces of legislation (601). Interestingly, though, Oldmixon
and Schecter find religion to have a stronger effect when “narrower questions related to
food assistance emerge” (602). As the scope of a bill narrows and a vote is more clearly
in response to a single issue—such as in the case of the amendment to the appropriations
bill—religion gains influence. The authors claim that it is easier for members of
Congress to act on a “religious imperative” when that is the only issue worth considering
in a piece of legislation, rather than attempting to balance religious views with multiple
policy goals (601).
The study of the influence of religion on policy areas outside of traditional
morality politics allows for these sorts of observations to be made. Oldmixon and
Schecter are able to see clearly the influence religion has on policy when a specific issue
is isolated, yet they also observe the tendency for religion to lose its influence as an issue
is muddled with more traditional non-religious pieces of legislation. Damon Cann agrees
with Blackstone and Oldmixon and Oldmixon and Schecter that religion must be
considered outside of the sphere of morality politics, but he does so in a study in which
he hopes to illustrate the cohesion of a particular religious group. Cann looks at the
voting behavior of Mormon legislators in all non-unanimous votes in the 109th Congress.
His study is aimed at analyzing the extent to which Mormon representatives vote as a
bloc, as he predicts that Mormon legislators will “display a very high degree of cohesion
in roll-call voting” if they are truly influenced by their religion (2009, 113). To his, and
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my, surprise, however, Cann finds that Mormon representatives are no more likely to
exhibit similar voting patterns than a randomly selected group of representatives with the
same partisan makeup (2009, 117). If Cann had focused solely on morality politics it is
likely that he would have observed a higher degree of cohesion from these
representatives than he did when analyzing all non-unanimous votes, which reaffirms the
necessity of applying models to issues outside of the traditional religious sphere in order
to accurately understand the relationship between religious salience and legislative
behavior.

BEHAVIOR BEYOND THE ROLL CALL

In his book, The Personal Roots of Representation, Barry Burden makes the case
that representational behavior needs to be studied through lenses other than that of rollcall vote analysis. He argues that members of Congress act most proactively through
“upstream behaviors,” such as co-sponsorship and speechmaking (2007, 8). Burden
defines proactive behavior as “action that requires initiative,” including “doing research
outside of committee, lobbying fellow members, contacting interest groups, making floor
speeches, and introducing and co-sponsoring legislation” (2007, 9). The key component
of proactive behavior, however, is that it “requires a conscious decision by the legislator
to take action in advance of a floor vote” (2007, 9). Engaging in proactive behavior, as
Burden describes, is costly for members of Congress, and therefore the issues with which
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a member is likely to proactively engage must be those in which a member has some
investment or personal interest (2007, 76).
The two proactive behaviors on which Burden focuses are co-sponsorship and
floor speeches. He articulates that the importance of observing bill sponsorship is the
fact that it allows members to articulate a clear position on the issue, makes members
publically accountable to their claimed position, and draws attention to the issue (2007,
76). Speeches, additionally, allow members to establish a position, yet are more of a
symbolic gesture intended to indicate a position to constituents (2007, 76). Through his
research Burden illustrates how personal and district interests are more likely to affect
proactive than reactive behavior, and that proactive behavior tends to return more
rewards from political action committees than reactive behavior (2007, 87). Burden
makes it clear that proactive behavior elicits more positive externalities—namely those of
furthering one’s personal and constituent interests—than reactive behavior, which
indicates the importance of considering such behavior.
Oldmixon expands on Burden’s understanding of pre-vote behavior: “Legislators
have the least personal agency in roll call voting, whereas pre-vote activities provide
them with opportunities to shape legislation ‘upstream’ and with more independence
from party leaders and constituents” (2009, 502). The fact that the majority of studies on
the relationship between religion and politics focus solely on roll-call votes eliminates the
“upstream” arena in which representatives express their independent views and indicate
unwavering support of an issue, through behaviors such as sponsorship or co-sponsorship
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of legislation. Bethany Blackstone and Elizabeth Oldmixon, however, provide an
example of the benefit of studying proactive behavior in addition to reactive behavior.
Blackstone and Oldmixon investigate the existence of intra-party division as
motivated by religion, and use floor speeches to observe such a phenomenon (2015).
They argue that members are time constrained and have varying interests that lead them
to pursue different policy agendas. The means through which these agendas are pursued
also vary greatly, and can be observed through members’ “decision to participate” (2015,
2). Blackstone and Oldmixon found in general that Evangelical Protestants give more
floor speeches than their colleagues, yet did not find any variance between Catholic
representatives’ floor-speech frequency and that of their colleagues (2015, 5). On social
issues, however, both Catholics and Evangelical Protestants engage in more proactive
behavior than their colleagues (2015, 5). Blackstone and Oldmixon found that members
of Congress use proactive behavior—namely floor speeches—to influence their personal
agendas, and that these agendas influenced in party by religion (2015, 6). The authors
conclude their study by stating, “While speech participation provides opportunities for
legislators to engage in personal representation, it also provides opportunities to represent
constituency religious communities…Legislators with limited opportunities to engage in
representation using floor votes look for other outlets. Speeches provide an outlet where
legislators can advertise and position-take” (2015, 6). I argue that this logic is applicable
to all proactive representation.
I intend to apply the logic of Blackstone and Oldmixon’s study to my research of
bill sponsorship, as opposed to their focus on floor speeches. I am interested in bill
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sponsorship for the reasons Burden outlined: bill sponsorship is an extremely public
means through which representatives may take a position on an issue, and will only be
utilized in cases in which a member feels a strong tie to an issue. Studying bill
sponsorship allows me to observe behavior the behaviors of the most involved and
passionate members.

MEMBERS MIRROR THE MASSES

In addition to considering the impact of members’ religious salience on their
representational behavior on and off of the House floor, it is worth considering the impact
of the religion of members’ districts on their legislative decisions. Fastnow, Grant, and
Rudolph claim, “religion does affect roll call voting,” yet “mirror[s] trends demonstrated
in the masses” (1999, 686). Green and Guth study this phenomenon statistically in their
article, “Religion, Representatives, and Roll Calls” (1991). They find constituency
religion to be statistically significant in explaining the behavior of members of Congress,
even when controls for district demography and members’ personal attributes are
introduced (1991, 571). Green and Guth find theologically conservative districts to be
negatively correlated to a liberal voting pattern, and constituencies of more moderate
theological views to be positively correlated to a liberal voting record (1991, 575). They
conclude that “denominational composition of districts is independently associated with
congressional voting, with the aggregate theological conservatism of districts negatively
associated with liberal voting. In addition,” they state, “district-level religiosity seems to

22
influence congressional behavior in the context of member’s partisanship and
denominational affiliations” (1991, 579). Scholars have accepted that the religion of a
member’s district affects their voting behavior, yet in my study I will use constituency
religion as a control variable to understand the relationship that a member’s own religion
has on his or her representational behavior.

CONCLUSION

Scholars of the influence of religion on representational decision making tend
either to oversimplify their measure of religion or underestimate the variety of ways in
which members of Congress demonstrate their policy stances. James Guth and Lyman
Kellstedt have developed detailed measures of religiosity, yet fail to apply their variable
to representational behavior, focusing more on representational alignment. Their
research is focused solely on the 105th Congress (1997-1999) and serves more as a
predictive measure of how religious members of Congress align on policy issues rather
than studying specific representational behavior (Guth and Kellstedt 2005). Bethany
Blackstone and Elizabeth Oldmixon, however, recognize the need for studying religion in
the context of representational decision making, yet use self-reported religious affiliation
from the Congressional Directory as their only measure of religiosity (2015). There is a
need in the academic study of religion and politics to combine these two approaches to
the study of the influence of the religious salience of members of Congress in how they
behave, which is what I hope to accomplish through this thesis.
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Through this research I aim to not only update existing research by focusing on
the 114th Congress, but also to combine what I have found to be the most detailed
measurements of religious salience with a range of arenas in which political behavior can
be observed. I will study sponsorship and co-sponsorship on issues of morality and those
outside of the traditional religious realm. The precedent for conducting such research is
well established from previous studies, yet none have accomplished the task of finding
the relationship between nuanced religious salience variables and legislative behavior
outside of roll-call votes on morality issues. The analysis of these precise variables is
what I intend to accomplish in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

When considering religious salience of members in conjunction with billsponsorship tendencies, I predict that religion will prove to be significant in predicting
sponsorship behavior, and that members with higher levels of commitment to their
religion will be more likely to sponsor and cosponsor bills in the issue categories of
abortion, gay rights, religious freedom, and refugee politics. As stated in the previous
chapter, after studying existing research on the influence of religion in Congress, I
determined that the methods of analysis previously used by scholars in this field were
oversimplified in terms of their measure of religion or too narrow in their focus of ways
in which members of Congress take policy stances. In order to improve upon these
shortcomings of previous research I was faced with the task of designing and collecting
data for an original dataset. I needed to collect religious denominations, religious
salience, and cosponsorship of select bills to form a useable dataset for the purposes of
this research.
I realized quickly that with the depth of research I intended to conduct it was
going to become necessary to limit the breadth of my research. For this reason I limited
my analysis to the 114th Congress (January 2015 through January 2017). In this chapter I
will outline how I went about collecting data on members’ religion and religious salience
and the categorization of these variables, the process of selecting which pieces of
legislation to analyze for cosponsorship, and the control variables I introduced to the
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study. I will conclude this chapter by addressing the shortcomings of these variables and
the data I obtained.

MEMBERS’ RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SALIENCE

Collecting and determining the religion of members of Congress was perhaps the
most complex aspect of creating my dataset. As previously stated, I needed some
measure of determining both the religion of a member and the extent to which the
religion pervades the member’s life. The Congressional Directory, the official directory
of the U.S. Congress produced by the Joint Committee on Printing (U.S. Government
Publishing Office 2016), and the CQ Press Congress Collection, an independent, nonbiased congressional reference tool (CQ Press 2017), both contain basic biographical
information about members of Congress. In addition to race, I obtained a basic religious
denomination for all but 21 members from the CQ database. The Congressional
Directory occasionally had a specific congregation with which a member is affiliated, yet
most information was contained in the CQ database. In addition to these two sources I
consulted each member’s biography listed on their official congressional website. If a
religion was cited in the member’s website biography that was the denomination to which
I assigned the member, as this is the religion the member herself chose to display. In
cases in which the member did not cite a religion on her website, I used the denomination
given by the Congressional Directory. Lastly, if a religion was not cited in either the
member’s website or Congressional Directory entry, I used the religion provided by CQ.
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CATEGORIZATION OF RELIGION

Once I obtained a religious denomination for each member I was tasked with
grouping each member into a denominational family with similar theological leanings.
This task is inherently complex as the level of detail each member of Congress provided
on his or her religion varies widely and often is no more specific than simply claiming
“Christian” as his or her religion. Furthermore, even if a member were to state her
denomination as Presbyterian, for example, the level of variation on theological leanings
within the Presbyterian denomination varies greatly. The Presbyterian Church is divided
into three differing subdivisions: the more liberal Presbyterian Church of the United
States of America (PCUSA), the more conservative Presbyterian Church in America
(PCA), and the newer evangelical ECO branch of the Presbyterian Church. These three
subdivisions would all claim to be Presbyterian, and a member would likely indicate her
religion as such if asked to claim a denominational affiliation, yet this label does little to
indicate the nature of the member’s beliefs.
Despite the fact that much of the denominational data I was able to obtain was
vague, I used Elizabeth Oldmixon’s practice of categorizing denominations into seven
groups, and added an eighth group for members who claim no religious affiliation
(Oldmixon 2005, 122). She bases her changes on the research conducted by Wade Clark
Roof and William McKinney (1987). In categorizing denominations, specifically those
that claim a Protestant tradition, Roof and McKinney consider “theology, history, social
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class, group experience, race, and other factors” (1987, 79). These criteria account for
variance in “core beliefs and institutional commitments along a liberal-to-conservative
denominational continuum” (1987, 79). Table 1 shows the categories in which I grouped
members of Congress for analysis.

Insert Table 1

As Oldmixon does not specifically state where she would categorize nondenominational Christians I grouped them with Mainline Protestants. Despite the fact
that there are necessarily some non-denominational Christians who would better align
with Evangelicals who are grouped in the Fundamentalist category I was forced to
generalize all 27 members who identify as “Christian” or “non-denominational Christian”
into one category, and therefore chose Mainline Protestants. I also included Rep.
Markwayne Mullin (R-OK) in the Fundamentalist as he identifies as a Pentecostal, which
aligns with the denominations Oldmixon grouped together in the Fundamentalist category
despite the fact that she does not include Pentecostals in her list.
In addition to vague and unique denominational claims, the other difficulty I came
across was whether or not to categorize African American representatives in the “Black
Protestants” group if they did not specifically state that they belonged to a Black
Protestant church. Rep. Brenda Lawrence (D-MI), for example, is African American, yet
only cites “Christian” as her religion. In cases such as this I chose to group her and
others in the Black Protestants category. I will stipulate that this, again, is gross
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oversimplification, yet without more specific data about what church she attends I was
forced to include her in a group based on the limited information I could gather.

RELIGIOSITY

In order to accurately measure religious salience, however, I was interested in
more than a self-reported religion. I needed some measure of the extent to which religion
is pervasive in a member’s life. For this task I also used the data I collected from
members’ websites and the Congressional Directory. In twenty cases the Congressional
Directory listed a Representative as being a member at or attending a specific church, yet
the majority of information I received about members’ religious salience was obtained
through their official biographies on their websites. Members frequently cite regular
attendance, membership, leadership positions, and, in five cases, pastoral roles. These
kinds of claims are the ones I used to create a scale of religiosity.
To create a scale of religious salience I adopted the model used by James Guth
and Lyman Kellstedt. Their scale ranges from one to four with a measure of one
indicating “no apparent religious involvement,” two indicating “formal membership in a
congregation, but no regular activity,” three as “frequent or regular attendance at
services,” and four signaling a member’s holding of “leadership positions in a
congregation and/or activity in parachurch groups” (Guth and Kellstedt 2005, 10). When
assigning values of religiosity to members I encountered several biographies that
indicated a member’s attendance at a specific church. When given this limited
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information I chose to assign a member to the third category, which indicates frequent
attendance despite the fact that the biography was ambiguous as to the frequency of the
member’s attendance.

LEGISLATIVE DATA

To go about selecting which pieces of legislation to analyze I was interested in
considering the two categorizes of bills most frequently studied when determining the
influence of religion on Congress: reproductive rights and gay rights. I was also
interested in looking at religious freedom in its own category, separate from legislation
surrounding reproductive and gay rights. In addition to these three categories I thought it
was important to include a category of legislation that goes beyond traditional “morality
politics” categories. For this reason I included legislation related to the issue of refugees.
These four categories of bills are the categories in which I will study the influence of
religion on members’ sponsorship behavior.

SELECTING LEGISLATION

When creating a finalized list of legislation I intended to study I used the
advanced search tool on Congress.gov, the “official website for U.S. federal legislative
information” (Congress.gov 2017). The advanced search allowed me to limit my analysis
to all public and private legislation introduced in the House of Representatives during the
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114th Congress. I was also able to limit the scope of the search to include Legislative
Subject Terms to narrow the returns of my search keywords, which were searched in all
summaries and titles. Legislative Subject Terms are assigned by the Congressional
Research Service (CRS) to “describe a measure’s substance and effects” (Congress.gov
2017). The CRS has a vocabulary of over 1,000 Legislative Subject Terms, and I chose
relevant subject terms for each category of legislation I was studying in addition to the
keyword (or words) I was searching.
When gathering pieces of legislation to include in my abortion category I
searched the term “abortion” and included the Legislative Subject Term “abortion.” The
religious-freedom category was equally straightforward: I searched “religious freedom”
without quotation marks so as to allow for word variation, and included the Legislative
Subject Term “religion.” For refugees, as well, I only included one Legislative Subject
Term; I searched the term “refugee” and included the Legislative Subject Term
“refugees, asylum, and displaced persons.” The gay-rights category was slightly more
detailed as I included three relevant Legislative Subject Terms: I searched “gay” and
included the terms “marriage and family status,” “sex, gender, sexual orientation
discrimination,” and “civil rights and liberties, minority issues.”
The abortion search returned 42 pieces of legislation, religious freedom returned
75, gay rights returned 12, and refugee policies returned 73 pieces of legislation. As this
return of 202 bills was going to be too large for me to code the cosponsorship for each
bill I added an additional criteria that required each bill to have greater than or equal to
50 cosponsors in order for me to include it in my dataset. This stipulation not only
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simplified the process of collecting cosponsors, but also ensures that the bills I am
analyzing are subjectively important enough to members of Congress that 50 or more
members are willing to cosponsor such a piece of legislation. Once narrowing the list of
bills by imposing the 50-cosponsor cutoff, I was left with 13 bills related to abortion, 15
religious freedom bills, 7 pieces of legislation related to gay rights, and 8 concerning
refugee policies, totaling 43 pieces of legislation.
In categories that contain legislation that produce opposing cosponsorship
trends—for example within the abortion category there are pieces of legislation
advocating for pro-life measures and others advocating for pro-choice causes—I divided
the category into a subgroup so as to better analyze representational behavior. Abortion
was divided into a pro-life subcategory, containing 12 pieces of legislation, and a prochoice subcategory containing two pieces of legislation; and the refugee category was
divided into a pro-refugee section, which only contains one resolution, and an antirefugee subcategory, containing 7 bills. Religious freedom and gay rights were
maintained as one category as the legislation within these two categories advocated for
religious freedom and gay rights, respectively.

COMPILING COSPONSORSHIP DATA

Once I had my list of legislation I needed to add data on each member’s
cosponsorship for these 43 bills, resolutions, and concurrent resolutions. I used the
“cosponsors” tab on congress.gov for each piece of legislation and added a dummy
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variable with 1 indicating a member signed on as a cosponsor and 0 indicating the
absence of cosponsorship for each member for these 43 bills.

HANDLING VACANCIES

There were a handful of districts in which a member did not finish their term in
office, which posed a problem when merging my data with descriptive data about
congressional districts. For all eight cases in which a seat was left vacant for any period
of time I used the data from the representative who held the seat longer during the 114th
Congress, which correlated to having more cosponsorship data for each district. (See
note on handling vacancies in the appendix.)

CONTROL VARIABLES

In addition to collecting data on members’ religion and cosponsorship patterns I
included three control variables in addition to standard control variables, such as party
and race. The three additional variables I added to my analysis are the 2014 Cook
Partisan Voter Index, DW-Nominate Scores, and a measure of District Religion.
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2014 COOK PARTISAN VOTER INDEX

Through his analysis, Barry Burden concludes that district interests affect
proactive behavior, such as cosponsorship trends (Burden 2007, 87). District interests
can be measured in a variety of specific policy questions, yet I chose to measure district
interest through partisanship, as measured by the margin of victory in previous
presidential races. In order to control for the partisan leanings of each Congressional
District I included the 2014 Cook Partisan Voter Index (PVI) in my dataset. The Cook
PVI serves as an index that attempts to “find an objective measurement of each
congressional district that allows comparisons between states and districts” (The Cook
Political Report 2017). The Cook PVI indicates how conservative or how liberal each
district was in the previous two presidential elections, with a score of R+3 indicating that
the district was, on average, 3 points more conservative than the national average in the
previous two presidential elections. The 2014 PVI, therefore, includes districts’ voting
patterns in the 2008 and 2012 elections (The Cook Political Report 2017).
When I inputted the PVI into my dataset I indicated Democratic districts with a
negative number and Republican districts with a positive number. A representative with
a district PVI of -34, therefore, would indicate the member’s district voted an average 34
points more Democratic than the nation as a whole in the 2008 and 2012 elections.
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DW-NOMINATE SCORES

The second control variable I incorporated into my analysis is the DWNOMINATE Score for each member, as generated by Keith Poole and Howard
Rosenthal. The Cook PVI allows me to control for the ideology of each district whereas
the DW-Nominate Score serves to control the ideology of each member.
DW-Nominate stands for dynamic, weighted, nominal three-step estimation, and
is a roll-call scaling method that was created by Poole and Rosenthal in 1985 (Poole and
Rosenthal 2001, 6). NOMINATE scales “legislators by their ideological location in socalled issue space within each and every Congress” (Everson, Valelly, and Wiseman
2016, 98). This scale uses all non-unanimous roll calls to map legislators on a left-right
issue space that indicates members’ policy preferences relative to other members. This
spatial measure is useful in controlling for the overall ideology of each member.
Ideology, as measured by NOMINATE scores, is useful in determining the degree
to which a member adheres to his or her party. NOMINATE serves as a more specific
control variable than party, as party is limiting in its binary identification, whereas
NOMINATE introduces a spatial approach to interpreting Congress (Everson, Valelly,
and Wiseman 2016, 101). Such an approach is useful in determining the extremity of a
member’s views and if it is her ideology is differentiates her from her party, or if perhaps
another factor, such as religiosity is at play.
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DISTRICT RELIGION

In addition to controlling for the ideology of each state and the partisan leaning of
each member I argue that controlling for the constituents’ religion in each district is
equally as important. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Green and Guth found that
the denominational composition of a district was significant in predicting voting patterns
of representatives. As district religion has proven to be significant in affecting legislative
behavior I would be remiss to neglect such a variable when looking to understand the role
that a member’s religion has on his or her cosponsorship behavior. To obtain information
for each congressional district I used data from the Cooperative Congressional Election
Study (CCES) and the U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations and Membership
Study (RCMS).
The CCES is a survey taken by over 50,000 citizens across the nation to “study
how Americans view Congress and hold their representatives accountable during
elections, how they voted and their electoral experiences, and how their behavior and
experiences vary with political geography and social context” (Ansolabehere and
Schaffner 2015, 7). This survey was selected as the primary source from which I
obtained my data as it provided the most data for each individual district and the most
options for respondents to select as their religious identity. Despite this fact, some
districts had fewer than 100 respondents so making generalizations about the dominant
religion for that district is a bit crude. Other national surveys, like the American National
Election Studies (ANES) survey, however, have even fewer options for respondents to
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select when identifying their religion: the ANES survey only gives respondents the option
to answer Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or other/none. The sample size of the ANES is
also less than a tenth of the size of the CCES (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2015).
After determining that I was going to include data from the CCES survey I
categorized each congressional district with a unique code, labeled “statecd,” to allow
Stata to analyze each district individually. This unique code allowed me to obtain
summary religious data for all survey respondents in a particular district. I tabulated data
from each district and used the “religpew” CCES variable to determine if the plurality of
respondents in a district were Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Eastern or Greek
Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Atheist, Agnostic, Nothing in particular, or
Something else. In only a handful of districts was there one religion to which a majority
of adherents prescribe, and in a few cases, the plurality was under 30% of respondents in
the district. Despite these low plurality numbers I still used this data for the reasons
previously mentioned.
The biggest complication that the CCES dataset provided, however, was the fact
that despite the multitude of options given respondents to indicate which religion they
adhere to, there was only one response for Protestants, whereas my categories for
members’ religion have four (Fundamentalist and non-traditional conservatives,
Mainline, Black, and Liberal). In order to have consistent categories for members of
Congress and their district I needed to consult an additional data source. The RCMS, as
compiled by Mark Stetzler of High Point University, contained more specific data on the
Protestant makeup of each district (Stetzler and Yanus 2015). The RCMS, however, only
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indicates the percentage of a district that is Evangelical or Mainline, so I am still left
without a measure of Liberal Protestants and Black Protestants. For each district that the
CCES indicated was Protestant, I cross-referenced the RCMS to determine whether the
district was more Evangelical or Mainline. In ten cases the percentage of Evangelicals
and Mainlines in a district were equal, so I indicated that the district was Mainline
Protestant. One potential problem this dataset poses, however, is that it records religious
membership, not just identification like the CCES. For this reason there were
discrepancies between the RCMS and the CCES in terms of if Protestant or Roman
Catholic was the dominant religion. I maintained the results of the CCES and simply
consulted the RCMS to determine whether Evangelical or Mainline had higher
membership rates in districts that the CCES indicated were Protestant. One inconsistency
between these two surveys, however, is that the CCES was administered following the
2014 Congressional Election, whereas the RCMS data was obtained following the 2012
Presidential Election. It is unlikely that there would be a substantial change in the RCMS
data between 2012 and 2014, but combining these two surveys is operating on the
assumption that the RCMS and CCES data are similar enough to do so.
Once the religion for each district was determined, I inputted the religion—based
on the categories I used when classifying members of Congress—into my database. In
the instances in which there was a tie for the majority religion I took an average of the
two religion categories. For example, if a district were tied between Evangelical and
Roman Catholic the district’s religion value would be 1.5.

38
CONCLUSION

In compiling my original dataset I was tasked with collecting data on members’
religious identity, religious salience, and cosponsorship behavior; including a measure of
control for members’ ideological leanings; accounting for the religious affiliation of each
district; and controlling for the partisanship of each district. I believe the data I have
collected is an improvement upon other datasets that researchers have used to study this
issue as I accounted for both religious affiliation and religious salience and included nonmorality issues in the types of bills I am studying.
I will not hesitate, however, to admit that there are shortcomings with this dataset.
In terms of collecting data on the religious affiliation and religiosity of representatives,
members were not equally specific or inclusive on their websites or in the Congressional
Directory. Members make strategic decisions when determining how to present
themselves to their district, and a key form of their presentation is their official
biography. From personal experience with a few members, I know that their websites
neglected to include their faith despite the fact that it is important to them and that they
have admitted to letting their religion influence their decision-making. I can imagine that
this is true for many members of Congress, yet I have no way of confirming nor denying
this, so I was left with what information I found on their official website, in the
Congressional Directory, or in CQ Press’ Congress Collection. Measuring religious
affiliation and salience in this manner likely undercounts the religiously committed, and
will therefore underestimate the effect of religion on members’ legislative behavior. This
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underrepresentation of religious salience will be demonstrated in my data as a
conservative measure of significance: if religious salience or denomination is significant
in my data, then it is likely that if I had a more accurate measure of religion my data
would be more significant than what I found.
The categorizations I was forced to make when grouping members into
denominational classes are also a shortcoming of this dataset. As previously mentioned,
when assigning African American Protestants to a denominational class, if they did not
specify a particular church I chose to group them with Black Protestants. If a member
only listed that they were “Christian” or “non-denominational Christian” I grouped them
with Mainline Protestants, but this decision is also one in which I was forced to make
gross generalizations based on the limited information members gave.
This dataset is not without its flaws, yet I argue that it is a vast improvement upon
previous data researchers have used for the study of the influence of religion on
legislative behavior.

40

CHAPTER 4: ANALYSES

In conducting my analysis I was interested in studying the role of religion in
members of Congress’ cosponsorship behavior in the following four legislative areas:
abortion, gay rights, religious freedom, and refugee issues. To examine the scope of
religion’s influence I studied both the impact of the member’s denominational affiliation
and religious salience for each of the four legislative categories. I predict that religion
will be significant in predicting cosponsorship trends across all four categories, yet I
expect the direction of the relationships between denominational affiliation and
religiosity for each category will differ. In this chapter I will first outline my hypotheses
for each legislative category, then outline descriptive and summary statistics for my
independent variables, and conclude by analyzing regression models for each of my four
legislative categories.

HYPOTHESES

As outlined in my methods chapter I divided the abortion category into two
subcategories: pro-life and pro-choice. I predict that as a member’s denomination gets
more religiously conservative (as denomgroup values decrease) a member will be more
likely to cosponsor pro-life legislation. For this reason I predict that there will be a
negative relationship between denomgroup and pro-life cosponsorship. I also assume
that as a member becomes more religious (as religiosity approaches 4) she will be more
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likely to cosponsor pro-life legislation, which will produce a positive relationship
between religiosity and pro-life cosponsorship. I predict the inverse to be true for prochoice cosponsorship and anticipate that there will be a positive relationship between
denomgroup and pro-choice cosponsorship and a negative relationship between
religiosity and pro-choice cosponsorship.
As the support for gay rights varies widely over the religious spectrum I predict
that denomgroup will be significant and have a positive relationship with gay-rights
legislation, indicating that more religiously liberal members have a higher likelihood of
cosponsoring gay-rights legislation and religiously conservative members will be less
likely to cosponsor legislation supporting gay rights. I also predict that there will be a
negative relationship between religiosity and cosponsorship of gay-rights legislation, as I
anticipate that members who are more religious will be less likely to support such
legislation.
For religious freedom, I expect to see similar trends to pro-life cosponsorship. I
anticipate that denomgroup will be negatively correlated to religious freedom
cosponsorship and that religiosity will be positively correlated to a member’s propensity
to cosponsor legislation protecting religious freedom.
Lastly, for the category of refugee issues I predict that a member’s denomination
and religious salience will be significant, yet I am unsure whether a religiously
conservative would be more likely to cosponsor pro-refugee or anti-refugee legislation.
As the religious right has made cases both for and against admitting refugees into this
country I cannot make a clear claim as to whether religious conservatives and those with

42
higher levels of religious salience will be more or less likely to sponsor pro-refugee
legislation. For this reason I do not have a directional hypothesis for either category of
refugee bills.

SUMMARY STATISTICS

After the process of collecting and compiling my data was complete I began my
analysis by conducting simple summary statistics. This section serves as a discussion of
these findings.

SAMPLE SIZE

For all of my analyses I have a sample size of 435 members of Congress, with
188 Democrats and 247 Republicans. I obtained cosponsorship, denominational, and
religious salience data for the additional six delegates to the House of Representatives,
yet was forced to exclude them from my analyses as they do not have NOMINATE
scores because they do not vote on legislation. In addition to the lack of NOMINATE
scores, delegates’ districts were not reported in the Cook Partisan Voter Index report, the
CCES, or the RCMS. For this reason—as I included either NOMINATE scores, Cook
scores, or district religion in all of my models—I was forced to exclude delegates from
my analyses.
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DENOMINATIONAL GROUP

As discussed in the previous chapter, my denominational variable was coded on a
scale from 1 to 8 with 1 indicating more traditional religions and 8 indicating no religious
affiliation. As seen in Table 2, the average denomgroup value is 2.816, indicating the
average member of Congress is between Roman Catholic and Mainline Protestant, but
closer to mainline Protestant.

Insert Table 2

The average Democratic member of Congress has a denomgroup value of 3.510
(Table 3), indicating they lie evenly between mainline Protestant and black Protestant.

Insert Table 3

As Table 4 shows, the average Republican member of Congress, however, has a
denomgroup value of 2.287, which signifies members lie between Roman Catholic and
mainline Protestant in their religious identification.

Insert Table 4
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The denominational group with the most members of Congress is mainline
Protestants, with Roman Catholics at a close second, followed by Fundamentalists and
nontraditional Protestants with 149, 138, and 70 members, respectively. This trend holds
true for Republican members of Congress, yet for Democrats the third most popular
religious identification is not Fundamentalists, but rather black Protestants. More
Democratic members identify as Jews or claim no religious affiliation than members who
identify as Fundamentalist or nontraditional Protestants. 97.17 percent of Republican
members of Congress identify as Fundamentalist, Roman Catholic, or mainline
Protestant, whereas only 62.23 of Democrats fall into these three denominational
categories. This indicates that Republican members of Congress tend to fall within the
three more conservative religious traditions whereas Democrat members of Congress are
more diverse and less conservative in their religious identification. Not only are
Republican members of Congress more conservative in their religious identification, they
are also more religious.

RELIGIOSITY

My religiosity variable was coded on a scale from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating no
apparent religious involvement and 4 indicating that the member holds a leadership
position within her congregation and/or involvement in a parachurch organization. Table
5 shows the mean religiosity value for the 435 members of the 114th Congress is 1.418
with a standard deviation of 0.885.
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Insert Table 5

Republicans have a higher mean religiosity value of 1.555 than that of the
Democrats (1.239), as illustrated in Tables 6 and 7, respectively.

Insert Tables 6 and 7

341 members of Congress indicate no apparent religious involvement (a
religiosity value of 1); 35 members of Congress indicate a formal membership in a
congregation, but no frequent attendance (religiosity = 2); 30 members cite frequent or
regular attendance at services (religiosity = 3); and 29 members indicate that they hold
leadership positions or are involved in parachurch organizations (religiosity = 4). Of
those 29 members with a religiosity value of 4, however, 22 of them are Republicans.
87.23 percent of Democrats have a religiosity value of 1, whereas 71.66 percent of
Republicans have a religiosity value of 1. This goes to show that overall Republicans
tend to have higher levels of religious salience than Democrats.
78.39 percent of members fall into the religiosity category of 1 whereas only 6.67
percent of members have a religiosity score of 4. This indicates that despite the fact that
only 17 members, or 3.91 percent of members, profess to have no religious affiliation
most members are religiously uninvolved. This discrepancy is likely due to the fact that
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members gain a political advantage by signaling to their district that they are religiously
affiliated despite the fact that perhaps they are uninvolved with their professed religion.
These basic statistics show that the average member of Congress is Republican,
identifying ideologically between Roman Catholic and Mainline Protestant, with a
religious-salience level between no apparent religious involvement and formal
membership in a congregation, yet no regular activity.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

As discussed in my methods chapter, when conducting my analyses I wanted to
control for the ideology of members of Congress, the ideology of their districts, and the
religion of congressional districts. Each of these controls was introduced in my
regressions as the independent variables dwnom1, cookpvi, and districtreli, respectively.
As I began conducting my regressions, however, I noticed that in several cases in which I
included both NOMINATE and Cook scores in the same model, one of these control
variables was often extremely insignificant. Because of these unexpected results I
conducted a correlation test to determine the collinearity between my variables, namely
dwnom1 and cookpvi. The Pearson’s r correlation values I obtained, as seen in Table 8,
were not too concerning for any case other than that of the relationship between dwnom1
and cookpvi. In this case NOMINATE and Cook are correlated at a value of 0.8718,
indicating that they are very highly correlated.
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Insert Table 8

Due to the high collinearity between dwnom1 and cookpvi I continued my
analyses by creating separate models using dwnom1 and cookpvi for each legislative
category. For each legislative category, therefore, I had four different regression tests for
each category: the first included members’ denomination, the religion of each
congressional district, and NOMINATE scores; the second included members’
denomination, district religion, and Cook Partisan Voter Index (PVI) scores; the third
consisted of the religious salience of members of Congress, district religion, and
NOMINATE; and the fourth had religiosity, district religion, and Cook PVI scores. I will
begin by analyzing the effect of religion on cosponsorship of abortion, then gay rights,
followed by religious freedom, and concluding with refugee-related legislation.

ABORTION

As stated in the previous chapter, in order to have clear regression results it was
necessary to separate pieces of legislation within the same category based on their
ideological bend. If I were to include both pro-life and pro-choice legislation in the same
model understanding the effect of religion on abortion cosponsorship the results would
likely be insignificant, yet when I separated my analysis into two separate sub-sections I
was able to gain significant insight into religion’s effect in both pro-life and pro-choice
cosponsorship.
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Pro-Life

As expected, members’ denomination had a negative relationship with
cosponsorship of pro-life legislation and religiosity had a positive relationship. This
indicates that as a member becomes more religiously conservative and has higher levels
of religious salience she is more likely to cosponsor pro-life legislation.
In predicting cosponsorship behavior on pro-life legislation a member’s
denomination proved significant when controlling for the religions of congressional
districts and the partisanship of districts, yet not in the model that includes NOMINATE
instead of Cook PVI. Religiosity is significant both the model that controls for members’
partisanship and district partisanship. The direction of these relationships is also
consistent with what I hypothesized.
When controlling for the religion of congressional districts and the partisanship of
members, neither the member’s religion nor the district’s religion are significant in
predicting cosponsorship trends (see Table 9.1). NOMINATE, however, is significant,
and has a positive correlation with pro-life cosponsorship.

Insert Table 9

In the model for members’ denomination and pro-life cosponsorship that includes
Cook scores as opposed to NOMINATE scores, the denomination of members of
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Congress is significant and has a negative coefficient (see Table 9.2). These results are
consistent with what I predicted, as this relationship indicates that as a member’s
religious identification increases by one point (a shift in the liberal direction of
denominations) the proportion of a member’s cosponsorship of pro-life legislation
decreases by 0.186. The effect of the partisanship of congressional districts is 0.0142,
and the effect of the denomination of districts is -0.00192 (see Table 9.2).
Religiosity, on the other hand, is significant in both the model that includes
NOMINATE scores (Table 9.3) and the model that includes Cook scores (Table 9.4). In
both cases, the religiosity coefficient is positive, which is consistent with my prediction.
As religiosity increases by one point (shifts on the scale towards more religious) the
proportion of cosponsored pro-life bills increases by 0.0252 in the model that includes
NOMINATE and by 0.0352 in the model that includes Cook scores. In each case
increasing the district’s denomination by one category in the more religiously liberal
direction decreases the proportion of cosponsored pro-life bills by 0.00485 and 0.00245,
respectively (see Table 9, models 3 and 4).
In all cases of pro-life cosponsorship the direction of the relationship between my
member-denomination and member-religiosity variables is consistent with what I
expected. In three out of the four models (all models except members’ denomination
when including NOMINATE scores) my variables of interest were significant which
leads me to believe that member’s religion and religious salience is an accurate and
significant predictor in determining cosponsorship behavior on pro-life legislation. These
relationships go to show that not only is a member’s tie to his professed denomination
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key in determining his stance on pro-life legislation, but his level of religious salience is
also significant in determining the proportion of pro-life bills he will cosponsor.

Pro-Choice

In three out of my four models measuring pro-choice cosponsorship the effect of
my key variables was as expected: denomination has a positive effect on cosponsorship
of pro-life legislation and religiosity has a negative effect. This indicates that as a
member becomes more religiously liberal and less religious she cosponsors a higher
proportion of pro-choice legislation.
In both models (including NOMINATE and including Cook scores) measuring
the relationship between members’ denomination and pro-choice cosponsorship
members’ denomination is significant in predicting cosponsorship. Both NOMINATE
and Cook scores are significant in their respective models (see Table 10, models 1 and 2
respectively), and the religion of congressional districts is not significant in either model.
In addition to being significant, the denominational variable also behaves as I expected:
there is a positive relationship between a member’s denomination and the proportion of
pro-choice bills she cosponsored in the 114th Congress. In other words, as a member’s
religion becomes more liberal the proportion of bills she cosponsors that support prochoice legislation increases.

Insert Table 10
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The religious salience of members of Congress, on the other hand, is not
significant in predicting cosponsorship of pro-choice legislation. In both models in
which I analyzed the relationship between religiosity and pro-choice cosponsorship the
religiosity variable is not significant. NOMINATE (Table 10.3) and Cook scores (Table
10.4) are significant in their respective models, and the religion of congressional districts
is not significant in either model.
The relationships between members’ religion and their religious salience and
cosponsorship of pro-life legislation are what I anticipated, aside from the lack of
significance between religiosity and cosponsorship. The directions of all variables
behaved as expected, with more religiously liberal and less religious members more
likely to cosponsor legislation that is supportive of pro-choice policies. Whereas pro-life
cosponsorship is impacted by both denominational affiliation and religious salience, prochoice legislation is less affected by religiosity and more determined by the denomination
to which a member ascribes.

GAY RIGHTS

The direction for my key variables in all four of my models’ relationship with gay
rights was as expected: there is a positive relationship between members’ denomination
and cosponsorship and a negative relationship with religious salience and cosponsorship.
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As seen in Table 11.1, when controlling for the religion of congressional districts
and the partisanship of members the denominational identification of members is both
positive and significant. A one-point shift in the liberal direction of religious
denominations indicates an increase in the proportion of cosponsored gay-rights bills by
0.0145. The religion of congressional districts is not significant, yet the ideology of
members, as expected, is significant. NOMINATE has a negative relationship with gayrights cosponsorship, which, again, is not surprising as an increase of one point in
NOMINATE measures the change in cosponsorship trends from an extremely
Democratic member to a centrist member (or the change from a centrist member to an
extremely Republican member), which indicates that the proportion of gay-rights bill a
member will cosponsor decreases by 0.525 (see Table 11.1).

Insert Table 11

When Cook scores are introduced into the model in place of NOMINATE scores,
members’ denomination is still a significant predictor in determining cosponsorship of
gay rights legislation (see Table 11.2). Denomination still has a positive relationship
with cosponsorship, just as it did in the model that included NOMINATE instead of Cook
scores. In this model, a one-point shift in members’ denomination in the liberal direction
raises the cosponsorship proportion of gay-rights legislation by 0.0289, and a one-point
shift in the liberal direction for Cook scores raises the cosponsorship proportion by
0.0127 (see Table 11.2).
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In both denomination models, the religion of congressional districts is not
significant in predicting cosponsorship of gay-rights legislation. The significance of
denomination in both models, however, indicates that the relative conservatism or
liberalism of a member’s religious affiliation is significant in determining their
propensity to cosponsor legislation that supports gay rights. When controlling for
members’ partisan leanings and the partisanship of congressional districts denomination
still has a significant effect on whether or not members cosponsor gay-rights legislation.
Religiosity, on the other hand, is not as consistently significant.
In one model measuring the effect of religiosity on the cosponsorship of gayrights legislation the variable proved to be significant, whereas in the other it was not
significant. As seen in Table 11.3, when controlling for the religion of congressional
districts and the partisanship of members, the religious salience of members of the House
of Representatives is not significant. Only NOMINATE scores were significant in this
model, with a one-point change in NOMINATE in the conservative direction estimating
that member will cosponsor 53.9 percentage points fewer bills supporting gay-rights
legislation.
In the case when I controlled for the partisanship of districts as opposed to the
partisanship of members, religiosity is significant in predicting cosponsorship, along with
Cook scores (see Table 11.4). The religion of districts is not significant in either model.
An increase in religiosity by one point lowers the cosponsorship proportion of gay-rights
legislation by 0.0283 points on average (see Table 11.4). An increase in Cook scores by
one point also decreases the cosponsorship proportion, yet in this case by 0.0135 points

54
(see Table 11.4). The direction of the religiosity variable, however, is consistent with the
direction of the NOMINATE variable and my hypothesis: as the level of religiosity
increases by one point, the proportion of bills a member cosponsors supporting gay-rights
decreases by 0.0283.
As illustrated with my four models, the strength of the relationships between my
two independent variables (denomgroup and religiosity) and gay-rights cosponsorship
varies, yet it is clear that members’ denomination is significant in predicting
cosponsorship patterns in this legislative area. Religiosity is significant in one case, yet
not in the other that controls for NOMINATE rather than Cook PVI. This shows that in
the model that controls for Cook scores, religiosity is accounting for some of the change
that exists within the NOMINATE variable. When controlling for NOMINATE as
opposed to Cook there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis as most of the
model is explained by the partisanship of members rather than their religiosity.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

In all four models in which I measured cosponsorship of religious-freedom
legislation neither members’ denomination nor members’ religious salience was
significant, yet in all cases the religion of congressional districts is significant with a 90%
confidence interval. These four models are the only models in all of my analyses in
which district religion is a significant predictor in cosponsorship trends.
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When measuring the effect of members’ denomination on religious-freedom
cosponsorship and controlling for district religion and member partisanship, district
religion is significant with a 90% confidence interval and NOMINATE is significant with
a 99% confidence interval (see Table 12.1). Denomination, however, is not significant in
predicting religious-freedom cosponsorship. I anticipated that members’ denomination
would be negatively correlated to religious-freedom cosponsorship, yet in this case
denomination has a positive coefficient. The fact that denomination is not significant,
however, indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and the coefficient, therefore,
is inconclusive. District religion has a negative relationship and NOMINATE has a
positive relationship with religious-freedom cosponsorship, both of which were expected.
These coefficients indicate that as the plurality religion of congressional districts
becomes one unit more liberal in tradition the likelihood of cosponsoring religiousfreedom legislation decreases by a proportion of 0.0106, and that as members’
NOMINATE score shifts one point in the conservative direction their likelihood of
cosponsoring such legislation increases by 0.0631 (see Table 12.1). NOMINATE has a
much smaller effect in this model than it does in other models, yet it is still statistically
significant.

Insert Table 12

Similarly, when controlling for Cook Partisan Voter Index scores as opposed to
NOMINATE, district religion remains significant at the 90% confidence interval level
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and with 99% confidence I can conclude that Cook is significant, while members’
denomination is, again, insignificant in predicting cosponsorship of religious-freedom
legislation (see Table 12.2). Like in the previous model, members’ denomination has a
positive regression coefficient, which is the opposite of what I anticipated, yet the lack of
significance indicates that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship with
religious-freedom cosponsorship. District religion and Cook scores both behave in the
manner I would expect: district religion has a negative relationship with religiousfreedom cosponsorship and Cook scores have a positive relationship with cosponsorship.
These results indicate that as districts become more religiously liberal, members are less
likely to cosponsor legislation supporting religious freedom, and while members’ districts
become more ideologically conservative members are more likely to cosponsor religiousfreedom legislation. Table 12.2 indicates that as districts shift one denomination group in
the liberal direction they are 0.0104 percentage points less likely to cosponsor religiousfreedom legislation. A shift of one point in the conservative direction for Cook scores
indicates that the average proportion of religious-freedom bills a member cosponsors will
increase by 0.00161.
In both models analyzing the effect of member’s denomination on religious
freedom cosponsorship, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the denominational
variable. Such results indicate that a member’s denomination is not a significant
predictor in determining a member’s cosponsorship habits on religious-freedom
legislation. The religion of a member’s district, however, is significant in this case and in
no other models that measure the effect of members’ denomination. More significant
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than district religion, however, are the ideology of members and the partisanship of
congressional districts.
The results for the effect of religiosity on cosponsorship of religious-freedom
legislation are similar to the results measuring the effect of members’ denomination on
such cosponsorship. In both religiosity models, religiosity is not significant enough to
reject the null hypothesis, yet district religion is significant at the 90% confidence interval
level, and I can conclude with 99% confidence that NOMINATE and Cook scores are
both significant.
In the model in which I control for the partisanship of members and district
religion, both control variables behave as expected while members’ religious salience is
not significant (see Table 12.3). Table 12.3 shows that district religion has a negative
coefficient, indicating that as the plurality religion of the district shifts one
denominational category in the liberal direction members will cosponsor a proportion of
0.0106 fewer religious-freedom bills. NOMINATE has a positive relationship with
religious-freedom cosponsorship and the proportion of bills a member cosponsors
increases by 0.0590 if a member’s partisanship increases, or shifts in the conservative
direction, by one point.
When controlling for district partisanship, as opposed to members’ ideology
district religion is still significant at the 90% level and members’ religiosity is still
insignificant (see Table 12.4). In both religiosity models there is a positive relationship
between religiosity and religious-freedom cosponsorship, which is what I hypothesized,
yet the lack of significance does not allow me to reject the null hypothesis. Table 12.4
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indicates that as the denomination of districts shifts one category in the conservative
direction a member will cosponsor 1.04 percent fewer religious-freedom bills. The
relationship between Cook scores and cosponsorship, however, is positive, illustrating
that as Cook scores increase by one point the proportion of religious-freedom
cosponsorship a member engages in will increase by 0.00154 (see Table 12.4).
The relationships I found in the four models I used to analyze the effect of
members’ religious identification and religious salience on their cosponsorship of
religious-freedom legislation were surprising. In none of my four models was either of
my member-religion independent variables significant. These results are perhaps due to
the fact that religious freedom, unlike the previous three legislative categories (pro-life,
pro-choice, and gay-rights), is a more bipartisan issue as it is constitutionally protected.
This fact could explain in part why the strength of NOMINATE in all four religiousfreedom models is significantly less than it is in other models.
NOMINATE’s strength in the religious freedom models is significantly smaller
than it is in the three previous legislative categories of pro-life, pro-choice, and gayrights. If supporting religious-freedom legislation is a less contested issue then perhaps
members’ partisanship is not the best predictor for determining cosponsorship. It is still
significant, yet not as strong as it is in other models.
The significance of district religion is also worth noting in these four models.
Despite using a level of significance of p < 0.05 for all other regressions in my analysis,
the fact that in these four cases, and no other models, district religion had p-values less
than 0.10 is interesting. This shows that despite the fact that a member’s denomination or
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religious salience might not be significant in predicting cosponsorship of religiousfreedom legislation, the religion of congressional districts is still significant. As
members’ districts become more conservative they have a higher incentive to appeal to
district preferences in taking a proactive stance on religious freedom, which leads to a
higher proportion of cosponsored bills. Despite the lack of significance for members’
denomination and religiosity, religion is still a factor in these models, as members
respond to their district’s religion in making decisions about cosponsoring religiousfreedom legislation.

REFUGEES

The last category in which I analyzed the relationship between members’
religious identification and religious salience and their cosponsorship trends was refugeerelated legislation. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, I did not have
directional hypotheses for how denomination and religiosity would affect cosponsorship,
yet I expected both variables to be significant in predicting cosponsorship trends.

Pro-Refugee

As I only included one pro-refugee resolution in my analysis I conducted logit
tests to observe the relationship between religion and cosponsorship, as opposed to the
regressions I used in all other cases. The results for my pro-refugee models are
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intriguing, yet not all that surprising. There is a positive relationship between members’
denomination and their propensity to cosponsor H.Res. 650, and also a positive—yet not
statistically significant—relationship between members’ religious salience and their
likelihood to cosponsor this pro-refugee resolution.
When controlling for the religion of congressional districts and the partisanship of
members, only the denomination of members of Congress is significant (see Table 13.1).
NOMINATE is not significant in this case, which is not entirely surprising as 36 of the
70 bill cosponsors are Democrat and the other 34 cosponsors are Republican members of
Congress. District religion is also not significant, leaving members’ denomination as the
only variable by which to explain pro-refugee cosponsorship in this model. Members’
denomination is significant in determining the likelihood of a member cosponsoring
H.Res. 650, and there is a positive relationship between denomination and cosponsorship.
This positive relationship indicates that as members become more religiously liberal they
are more likely to cosponsor this pro-refugee resolution.

Insert Table 13

Including Cook scores in my model in the place of NOMINATE does not change
the significance of district religion, and members’ denomination remains positive (see
Table 13.2). The significance level of denomination decreases slightly, as the p-value is
now greater than 0.5, but still less than 0.1. Cook Partisan Voter Index is also significant,
and has a negative relationship with cosponsorship of H.Res. 650, indicating that as
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members’ districts become more conservative they are less likely to cosponsor this prorefugee resolution. This trend is not surprising, as conservative districts are very likely to
be adamant about refugee issues, which encourages members to behave consistently with
their districts’ policy references.
In both models measuring the effect of religiosity on cosponsorship of H.Res. 650
religiosity is not significant, and I, therefore, cannot reject the null hypothesis.
NOMINATE and Cook scores are both significant—NOMINATE with 90% confidence
and Cook with 99% confidence (see Table 13, models 3 and 4, respectively).
With all of my logit tests for pro-refugee cosponsorship the R-squared values are
extremely low (between 0.0085 and 0.0283), which indicates that this model neglects an
important factor in determining members’ propensity to cosponsor such a resolution. It is
possible that geographic location of a member’s district will affect her propensity to
support (or oppose) pro-refugee legislation. Additionally, this specific resolution is not
particularly linked to most contemporary refugee conversations; this resolution would
“provide for the safety and security of Iranian dissidents living in Camp Liberty in Iraq”
(Foreign Affairs Committee 2016). If this resolution were more closely linked to Syrian
refugees or another issue more publicized it is likely that the results would have been
different.
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Anti-Refugee

The final subsection of regressions I conducted was to determine the relationship
between anti-refugee cosponsorship and denomination and religiosity. None of the four
models I conducted for anti-refugee cosponsorship had significant results aside from
NOMINATE and Cook scores.
When analyzing the effect of members’ denomination on their cosponsorship of
anti-refugee bills and controlling for district religion and member partisanship, the only
significant variable is member ideology (see Table 14.1). NOMINATE has a positive
relationship with anti-refugee cosponsorship, indicating that as members become more
conservative they are more likely to cosponsor anti-refugee legislation. Neither
members’ denomination nor their district’s religion is significant in predicting antirefugee cosponsorship, which indicates that the cosponsoring of this legislation is a
partisan decision, not based on religious ideals.

Insert Table 14

Replacing NOMINATE with Cook has no effect on the relationship between
denomination or district religion and anti-refugee cosponsorship (see Table 14.2). Cook
scores are significant yet again, and have a positive coefficient indicating that as a
member’s district becomes more ideologically conservative she is more likely to
cosponsor anti-refugee legislation. This model upholds my conclusion from the model
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that includes NOMINATE, claiming that anti-refugee cosponsorship is a partisan, rather
than religious, issue.
When looking at the effect of members’ religiosity on their cosponsorship habits
of anti-refugee legislation, the data indicates that there are no significant relationships
between religiosity or district religion. The only variables I included in my models that
are significant are NOMINATE and Cook scores (see Table 14, models 3 and 4,
respectively). Both are positive, illustrating that as members and districts become more
ideologically conservative the proportion of anti-refugee legislation they cosponsor will
increase.
I did not anticipate the lack of religious significance in anti-refugee legislation
compared to the denominational significance in the pro-refugee resolution I studied, yet
in retrospect this trend is not surprising. More liberal members of Congress who ascribe
to liberal religious traditions are supportive of refugees, yet when considering antirefugee legislation, which ideological conservatives support, religion is not significant in
predicting trends as most religious traditions have doctrines counter to this political
stance.

INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH MEMBERS’ RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SALIENCE

As the religion of congressional districts was not significant in any case other than
when considering cosponsorship of religious-freedom legislation I was curious what the
extent of the impact of district religion is when interacting with religiosity. As Green and
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Guth found significant relationships between constituency religion and members’
legislative behavior I was surprised that the district religion variable I used was rarely
significant (1997, 571). I was additionally intrigued by the lack of significance of
religiosity across my models. These two findings led me to question the strength of
religiosity if a member’s religion matches that of her district. I predict that if a member’s
denomination is consistent with her district’s denomination that the effect of religiosity
on her cosponsorship patterns will not change, or might even get weaker. I anticipate that
the effect of religiosity will strengthen, however, in cases in which a member does not
match her district’s denomination. As Fastnow, Grant, and Rudolph suggest, members
tend to mirror the masses, so when a member does not mirror her district on religious
affiliation she is put in the position of deciding whether to uphold her personal religious
beliefs or to mirror the beliefs of her district (1999, 686). I predict that the strength of a
member’s religious salience will determine her propensity to uphold her personal views
or to act with her district. For this reason, I anticipate that when interacting a match
variable with religiosity, the effect of religiosity will increase when the match variable is
0, indicating the lack of a consistent denomination across the member and her district.
This will be demonstrated through negative coefficients for the interaction variable,
demonstrating that when a match exits the effect of religiosity weakens.
The results from the interactive regressions I conducted are consistent with my
hypothesis in all cases except for pro-life and anti-refugee cosponsorship. There is a
positive correlation between the interaction variable in the cases of pro-life and antirefugee cosponsorship, which indicates that as members match their district’s religion the
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effect of religiosity on cosponsorship strengthens, yet in all other cases a match between
a member’s denomination and their district’s denomination weakens the effect of
religiosity on cosponsorship (See Table 15).

Insert Table 15

In the four other models in which the interaction variable has a negative
coefficient I can conclude that the effect of religiosity does not strengthen when a match
exists between members’ denomination and the denomination of their district, and in
some cases, the effect of religiosity weakens. This is not surprising, and consistent with
what I predicted, as a member who has higher levels of religiosity exhibits higher levels
of commitment to her religion, and her religiosity will be reinforced when challenged by
her constituents. A member who, on the other hand, is not extremely religious will likely
behave with an even lower level of religious commitment if persuaded by the opposing
views of her district.

PARTY-SPECIFIC REGRESSION MODELS

After analyzing regression models with members of both parties I conducted tests
for each party individually to determine if the effect of religion on members’ behavior is
just as relevant when considering each party separately. To determine the effect of
denominational group and religious salience within each party I conducted regressions
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controlling for district denomination, NOMINATE, and Cook PVI scores for Republicans
in the case of pro-life cosponsorship and Democrats in the cases of pro-choice and gayrights cosponsorship. I only considered three cases as these were the instances in which
the cosponsors were nearly or entirely from one party: two Democrats cosponsored prolife legislation, zero Republicans cosponsored pro-choice legislation, and two
Republicans cosponsored gay-rights legislation.
In the majority of cases both denominational group and religiosity retained their
significance when analyzing only a specific party rather than the entirety of the House.
In two cases the religious independent variables gained significance (see Tables 16.1 and
18.3), and in just one case was religiosity significant across the two-party model and not
significant when only considering one party (see Table 16.4).

Insert Tables 16, 17, and 18

These regression models go to show that not only are religious affiliation and
religiosity significant when studying the House as a whole, but they are also significant
within both Democratic and Republican subgroups.

CONCLUSION

In the 24 models I conducted, 7 out of the 12 regression tests analyzing the effect
of members’ denomination on cosponsorship had significant results for denomination,
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and 3 out of 12 regressions analyzing religiosity allowed me to reject the null hypothesis
and show religiosity’s significance in cosponsorship.
The levels of significance allow me to claim that member’s denomination is a
significant predictor of cosponsorship behavior in pro-life, pro-choice, gay-rights, and
pro-refugee legislative areas. My results also allow me to claim religiosity’s significance
in predicting cosponsorship in pro-life and gay-rights cases.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

I began my research with the question of religion’s significance in congressional
politics, and based on my analyses the answer at which I have arrived is: sometimes.
Religion is very clearly significant in traditional religious legislative arenas, yet when
stepping outside of morality politics into more of the abstract political sphere, religion
begins to lose its influence. Denomination tends to be more significant than religiosity,
yet the fact that both measures of religion are significant in various cases leads me to
reaffirm the notion that religious belief, behavior, and belonging are key to understanding
the impact religion has in the political arena.
In the legislative area of abortion, both members’ denomination and religious
salience are significant for pro-life legislation, yet only denomination is significant for
pro-choice legislation. I am not at all surprised by the results for pro-life cosponsorship,
as it indicates that more religious and more conservatively religious members of
Congress are more likely to cosponsor pro-life legislation. Even further, members whose
denominational affiliation is consistent with their district’s are even more influenced by
their religiosity in determining cosponsorship of pro-life legislation. In the case of prochoice cosponsorship, the denominational relationship to cosponsorship is what I
expected (members who are more religiously liberal are more likely to cosponsor prochoice legislation), yet I am surprised by the lack of significance for religiosity in this
case. The data indicates, however, that the level of religiosity is not as useful in
predicting cosponsorship as denomination is—illustrating that a member’s religious
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salience is not the key factor in determining her propensity to cosponsor pro-choice
legislation, it is more so determined by her religious affiliation. This indicates that
religious belief and belonging outweighs behavior, yet pro-life cosponsorship is guided
by belief, behavior, and belonging.
Gay-rights cosponsorship, like pro-life legislation, has significant relationships
with both members’ denomination and their religiosity, indicating, again, the influence of
belief, behavior, and belonging. Gay rights are guided in part by denominational doctrine
and affiliation, yet a member’s level of commitment to such doctrine is significant in
determining whether or not a member will cosponsor gay-rights legislation. More
religiously liberal and less religious members are more likely to cosponsor gay-rights
legislation.
Religious-freedom cosponsorship, unlike all other legislative categories, does not
have significant relationships with either members’ denomination or members’
religiosity. The one case in which religious freedom did have a significant relationship,
however, is with the religion of congressional districts, although this variable is not
significant for any other issue. District religion is only significant within a 90%
confidence interval, but this level of significance is interesting compared to the lack of
significance in all other cases. The lack of significance for denomination and religiosity
could perhaps be explained by the general support for this issue that is protected under
the First Amendment. Religious freedom is a bipartisan issue that is generally supported
by all, so it is not too surprising to find that members are generally supportive of religious
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freedom and that even controls for member and district partisanship have a smaller effect
in this case than in other legislative categories.
The last category in which I studied the influence of religion on cosponsorship
was refugee rights. The only instances in which a significant relationship existed with
denomination or religiosity was in the case of denomination and pro-refugee
cosponsorship. Religiosity is not significant in either pro- or anti-refugee cases, and
denomination is not significant in modeling anti-refugee cosponsorship. These results,
along with the positive relationship between denomination and pro-refugee
cosponsorship, lead me to believe that members will utilize their religion in non-morality
cases when it is politically useful. Religiously liberal members capitalize on what is a
more liberal cause by making religious cases for accepting refugees, whereas in antirefugee cases religion does not seem to matter, as religious conservatives cannot use their
religion as easily to advocate against assisting refugees. The ease with which members
use or neglect their religion is not surprising as religiosity is not significant in either prorefugee or anti-refugee cases, indicating that the commitment a member has to her
religion is not relevant when making decisions in cases such as these. In this case, only
belief and belonging are significant—not behavior.
It is also likely that religion would be significant in this non-morality case had the
issue been more narrowly focused. Oldmixon and Schecter found that when considering
legislation with a broad non-morality scope religion was not significant, yet when they
studied narrowly focused non-morality legislation religion was significant in predicting
cosponsorship (2011). Because of this, it is likely that had there been legislation more
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narrowly focused on refugee issues religion would have been a more significant
predictor.
In all cases in which my data produced significant results the relationships were
consistent with what I anticipated—indicating that religion does, in fact, have an impact
on congressional decision making in many cases. Denomination and religiosity tend to
be more significant in traditional religious, or morality cases, yet denomination is
significant in the case of pro-refugee cosponsorship. If I were to expand the scope of this
research further I would be interested in applying the same analysis techniques to more
non-morality legislative categories to understand better the scope of religion’s influence.
The significance of religion, as measured in both members’ denomination and
their religious salience, indicates that religion is a significant factor in congressional
decision making. These results demonstrate that members do adhere to personal religious
views—even when at odds with their district. The act of cosponsoring legislation allows
members to take a clear and defined position on an issue, and to do so without much
party pressure. This act gives members the ability to communicate to their district where
their priorities lie, yet comes with great cost, as Barry Burden discusses (2007, 76).
Burden’s conclusion that personal interests are significant predictors of proactive
behavior is consistent with my findings.
Religion is clearly pervasive in the political arena, and when attempting to
understand the factors members consider when making legislative decisions it is
imperative that scholars take into account the effect of members’ denominational
affiliation and members’ religious salience. Religion is not an abstract concept that can
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be divorced from members’ belief systems when making decisions about legislation—
religion is inherently tied with one’s beliefs and is therefore relevant when members
make decisions. Personal religious beliefs and behavior are empirically tied with policy
making, so the separation ideal that many propose is not feasible. This thesis has shown
that the high and impregnable wall that many believe separates religion from the state is
perhaps not as high nor impregnable as imagined.
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TABLES

TABLE 1—DENOMINATIONAL CATEGORIES
Fundamentalists
and
Nontraditional
Conservatives
Adventists
American Baptist
Convention
Assemblies of
God
Baptist
Baptist
Missionary
Association
Brethren in Christ
Christian
Missionary
Alliance
Christian
Reformed Church
Christian
Scientists
Church of Jesus
Christ of LatterDay Saints
Conservative
Baptist
Association
Evangelical
Evangelical
wings of mainline
denominations
Independent
Baptist
Nazarene
Southern Baptist

Roman
Catholics

Mainline
Protestants

Black
Protestants

American
Lutheran
Church
Christian

Black Baptists Congregationalists

Disciples of
Christ
Lutheran
Church in
America
Episcopal
Church
Presbyterian
Church U.S.A.
Protestant
Reformed
Church in
America
United
Methodist
Church

Black
Pentecostals
African
Methodist
Episcopal

Liberal
Protestants

Society of
Friends
UnitarianUniversalist

Jews

Other
small
groups

No
religious
affiliation
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TABLE 2—MEMBERS’ DENOMINATIONAL FREQUENCIES
denomgroup
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

Freq
(Percent)
70
(16.09)
138
(31.72)
149
(34.25)
35
(8.046)
4
(0.920)
18
(4.138)
4
(0.920)
17
(3.908)
435
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TABLE 3—DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS’ DENOMINATIONAL FREQUENCIES
denomgroup
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

Freq
(Percent)
7
(1.609)
65
(14.94)
45
(10.34)
34
(7.816)
2
(0.460)
17
(3.908)
4
(0.920)
14
(3.218)
188
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TABLE 4—REPUBLICAN MEMBERS’ DENOMINATIONAL FREQUENCIES
denomgroup
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
Total

Freq
(Percent)
63
(14.48)
73
(16.78)
104
(23.91)
1
(0.230)
2
(0.460)
1
(0.230)
3
(0.690)
247

TABLE 5—MEMBERS’ RELIGIOSITY FREQUENCIES
religiosity
1
2
3
4
Total

Freq
(Percent)
341
(78.39)
35
(8.046)
30
(6.897)
29
(6.667)
435
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TABLE 6—REPUBLICAN MEMBERS’ RELIGIOSITY FREQUENCIES
religiosity
1
2
3
4
Total

Freq
(Percent)
177
(40.69)
25
(5.747)
23
(5.287)
22
(5.057)
247

TABLE 7—DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS’ RELIGIOSITY FREQUENCIES
religiosity
1
2
3
4
Total

Freq
(Percent)
164
(37.70)
10
(2.299)
7
(1.609)
7
(1.609)
188
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TABLE 8—PEARSON’S CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
NOMINATE

Cook PVI

Religiosity

Denominational
Group

District
Religion

NOMINATE

1.0000

Cook PVI

0.8718

1.0000

Religiosity

0.1996

0.1789

1.0000

Denominational
Group
District Religion

-0.4011

-0.3748

-0.1542

1.0000

-0.0699

-0.0889

-0.0071

0.0450

1.0000

Interaction

0.1395

0.1590

0.3632

-0.2224

-0.0045

Interaction

1.0000

TABLE 9—PRO-LIFE REGRESSION MODELS
VARIABLES
Denominational Group
District Religion
NOMINATE

(1)
Pro-Life
Cosponsorship

(2)
Pro-Life
Cosponsorship

-0.00855
(0.00664)
-0.00452
(0.00818)
0.537***
(0.0233)

-0.0186**
(0.00725)
-0.00192
(0.00905)

Cook PVI

(3)
Pro-Life
Cosponsorship

(4)
Pro-Life
Cosponsorship

-0.00485
(0.00815)
0.539***
(0.0217)

-0.00245
(0.00904)

0.0142***
(0.000753)

Religiosity
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.257***
(0.0284)
435
0.608

0.337***
(0.0304)

435
0.521
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.0252**
(0.0111)
0.198***
(0.0258)

0.0146***
(0.000709)
0.0352***
(0.0123)
0.236***
(0.0286)

435
0.611

435
0.523
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TABLE 10—PRO-CHOICE REGRESSION MODELS
VARIABLES
Denominational Group
District Religion
NOMINATE

(1)
Pro-Choice
Cosponsorship

(2)
Pro-Choice
Cosponsorship

0.0212**
(0.00864)
-0.00816
(0.0107)
-0.746***
(0.0303)

0.0394***
(0.0101)
-0.0107
(0.0126)

Cook PVI

(3)
Pro-Choice
Cosponsorship

(4)
Pro-Choice
Cosponsorship

-0.00772
(0.0107)
-0.779***
(0.0285)

-0.01000
(0.0128)

-0.0186***
(0.00104)

Religiosity
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.347***
(0.0370)
435
0.646

0.222***
(0.0422)

435
0.510
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.00761
(0.0147)
0.398***
(0.0340)

-0.0200***
(0.00100)
-0.0101
(0.0174)
0.346***
(0.0405)

435
0.642

435
0.493

TABLE 11—GAY-RIGHTS REGRESSION MODELS
VARIABLES
Denominational Group
District Religion
NOMINATE

(1)
Gay-Rights
Cosponsorship

(2)
Gay-Rights
Cosponsorship

0.0145**
(0.00650)
-0.00742
(0.00801)
-0.525***
(0.0228)

0.0289***
(0.00758)
-0.00880
(0.00947)

Cook PVI

Observations
R-squared

(4)
Gay-Rights
Cosponsorship

-0.00701
(0.00804)
-0.539***
(0.0214)

-0.00815
(0.00958)

-0.0127***
(0.000788)

Religiosity
Constant

(3)
Gay-Rights
Cosponsorship

0.251***
(0.0278)
435
0.615

0.158***
(0.0318)

435
0.463
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.0148
(0.0110)
0.314***
(0.0255)

-0.0135***
(0.000751)
-0.0283**
(0.0130)
0.278***
(0.0303)

435
0.612

435
0.450
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TABLE 12—RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REGRESSION MODELS

VARIABLES
Denominational Group
District Religion
NOMINATE

(1)
Religious
Freedom
Cosponsorship

(2)
Religious
Freedom
Cosponsorship

0.00166
(0.00470)
-0.0106*
(0.00579)
0.0631***
(0.0165)

0.000251
(0.00466)
-0.0104*
(0.00583)

Cook PVI

(3)
Religious
Freedom
Cosponsorship

(4)
Religious
Freedom
Cosponsorship

-0.0106*
(0.00579)
0.0590***
(0.0154)

-0.0104*
(0.00582)

0.00161***
(0.000485)
0.00448
(0.00792)
0.315***
(0.0184)

0.00154***
(0.000457)
0.00575
(0.00792)
0.319***
(0.0184)

435
0.046

435
0.039

(3)
Pro-Refugee
Cosponsorship

(4)
Pro-Refugee
Cosponsorship

-0.0102
(0.108)
-0.506*
(0.294)

-0.0290
(0.106)

Religiosity
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.317***
(0.0201)
435
0.046

0.327***
(0.0196)

435
0.038
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE 13—PRO-REFUGEE LOGIT MODELS
VARIABLES
Denominational Group
District Religion
NOMINATE

(1)
Pro-Refugee
Cosponsorship

(2)
Pro-Refugee
Cosponsorship

0.178**
(0.0798)
-0.0128
(0.107)
-0.181
(0.317)

0.140*
(0.0785)
-0.0301
(0.106)

Cook PVI

-0.0180**
(0.00901)

Religiosity
Constant
Observations

-2.141***
(0.375)
435

-2.041***
(0.357)

435
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.129
(0.144)
-1.780***
(0.345)

-0.0247***
(0.00844)
0.151
(0.144)
-1.855***
(0.344)

435

435
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TABLE 14—ANTI-REFUGEE REGRESSION MODELS
VARIABLES

(1)
Anti-Refugee
Cosponsorship

(2)
Anti-Refugee
Cosponsorship

0.00525
(0.00594)
-0.00245
(0.00733)
0.335***
(0.0208)

-0.00204
(0.00627)
-0.00109
(0.00783)

Denominational Group
District Religion
NOMINATE
Cook PVI

(3)
Anti-Refugee
Cosponsorship

(4)
Anti-Refugee
Cosponsorship

-0.00229
(0.00733)
0.330***
(0.0195)

-0.00112
(0.00783)

0.00860***
(0.000651)

Religiosity
Constant

0.147***
(0.0255)

Observations
R-squared

435
0.408

0.200***
(0.0263)

-0.00743
(0.0100)
0.172***
(0.0232)

0.00868***
(0.000614)
-0.000487
(0.0106)
0.195***
(0.0248)

435
0.407

435
0.326

435
0.326
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE 15—INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOSITY AND A MATCH WITH
MEMBER AND DISTRICT DENOMINATION
VARIABLES

Pro-Life
Cosponsorship

Pro-Choice
Cosponsorship

Gay-Rights
Cosponsorship

Religious
Freedom
Cosponsorship

Pro-Refugee
Cosponsorship

Anti-Refugee
Cosponsorship

Member-District
Religion Match

-0.0355

-0.0356

-0.0234

0.00634

0.106

-0.00791

(0.0589)
0.0667***
(0.0214)
0.0385

(0.0818)
-0.0632**
(0.0297)
-0.0268

(0.0585)
-0.0691***
(0.0213)
-0.00367

(0.0274)
0.0113
(0.00997)
-0.00165

(0.0689)
0.0377
(0.0251)
-0.0731*

(0.0436)
0.0149
(0.0159)
0.0326

(0.0354)
0.175***
(0.0360)

(0.0491)
0.430***
(0.0500)

(0.0352)
0.332***
(0.0358)

(0.0165)
0.286***
(0.0168)

(0.0414)
0.106**
(0.0421)

(0.0262)
0.155***
(0.0267)

435
0.008

435
0.020

Religiosity
Interaction
Variable
Constant

Observations
R-squared

435
0.053

435
435
435
0.028
0.040
0.004
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 16—PRO-LIFE REGRESSION MODELS FOR REPUBLICANS
VARIABLES
Denominational Group
District Religion
NOMINATE

(1)
Pro-Life
Cosponsorship

(2)
Pro-Life
Cosponsorship

-0.0379**
(0.0150)
-0.0225
(0.0171)
0.807***
(0.108)

-0.0330**
(0.0149)
-0.0275
(0.0170)

Cook PVI

(3)
Pro-Life
Cosponsorship

(4)
Pro-Life
Cosponsorship

-0.0194
(0.0172)
0.802***
(0.110)

-0.0250
(0.0171)

0.0171***
(0.00218)

Religiosity
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.230***
(0.0741)
247
0.214

0.434***
(0.0579)

247
0.229
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.0278*
(0.0168)
0.0961
(0.0648)

0.0171***
(0.00222)
0.0234
(0.0167)
0.317***
(0.0489)

247
0.202

247
0.219

TABLE 17—PRO-CHOICE REGRESSION MODELS FOR DEMOCRATS
VARIABLES
Denominational Group
District Religion
NOMINATE

(1)
Pro-Choice
Cosponsorship

(2)
Pro-Choice
Cosponsorship

0.0272*
(0.0151)
-0.0255
(0.0192)
-0.724***
(0.260)

0.0329**
(0.0150)
-0.0298
(0.0196)

Cook PVI

(3)
Pro-Choice
Cosponsorship

(4)
Pro-Choice
Cosponsorship

-0.0237
(0.0194)
-0.824***
(0.257)

-0.0282
(0.0199)

-0.00505*
(0.00269)

Religiosity
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.402***
(0.117)
188
0.076

0.607***
(0.0781)

188
0.055
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.00722
(0.0400)
0.462***
(0.122)

-0.00573**
(0.00272)
-0.00927
(0.0408)
0.720***
(0.0782)

188
0.059

188
0.030
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TABLE 18—GAY-RIGHTS REGRESSION MODELS FOR DEMOCRATS
VARIABLES
Denominational Group
District Religion
NOMINATE

(1)
Gay-Rights
Cosponsorship

(2)
Gay-Rights
Cosponsorship

0.0198*
(0.0114)
-0.0210
(0.0146)
-0.414**
(0.197)

0.0239**
(0.0114)
-0.0221
(0.0149)

Cook PVI

(3)
Gay-Rights
Cosponsorship

(4)
Gay-Rights
Cosponsorship

-0.0189
(0.0145)
-0.509***
(0.191)

-0.0205
(0.0148)

-0.00144
(0.00204)

Religiosity
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.328***
(0.0888)
188
0.056

0.460***
(0.0592)

188
0.036
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.0736**
(0.0298)
0.446***
(0.0911)
188
0.072

-0.00238
(0.00203)
-0.0731**
(0.0304)
0.617***
(0.0584)
188
0.043
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NOTE ON HANDLING VACANCIES

The districts that were left vacant and how I handled selecting which member to consider
are as follows:
New York’s 11th District began the 114th Congress empty as Representative Michael
Grimm announced in December of 2014 that he would be resigning from his office on
January 5th after he plead guilty to tax evasion (Bash and Jaffe 2014). Despite the fact
that he did not serve in the 114th Congress his resignation after the November General
Election forced his seat to remain vacant for five months until Representative Daniel
Donovan was sworn in in May of 2015 (C-SPAN 2015). I used cosponsorship data from
Representative Donovan.
Representative Trent Kelly filled the vacancy in Mississippi’s 1st District on June 9th
2015 (Parks 2015) after Representative Alan Nunnelee passed away in February of 2015
(Diamond and Jaffe 2015). I used cosponsorship data from Representative Kelly.
Representative Darrin LaHood took over Representative Aaron Schock’s seat in Illinois’
18th District when Representative Schock resigned in March of 2015 over allegations that
he mishandled public funds, which included reports that he used taxpayer money to
redecorate his office in the style of Downton Abbey (Bash, Zeleny, and Jaffe 2015).
There was one of my 43 bills for which Rep. Schock signed on as a cosponsor, yet I had
far more data on Representative LaHood’s cosponsorship so I used Representative
LaHood’s data.
Representative Warren Davidson took over Speaker John Boehner’s seat in Ohio’s 8th
District after Speaker Boehner resigned in September of 2015 (Bash et al. 2015). I used
Representative Davidson’s data as it is uncommon for the Speaker to cosponsor bills, so
there were no cases in which Speaker Boehner cosponsored one of the pieces of
legislation I am studying.
Representative Chaka Fattah resigned his seat in Pennsylvania’s 2nd District in June of
2016 after charged with racketeering, money laundering, and fraud (Schleifer 2016). His
seat was filled in November by Representative Dwight Evans (Dwight Evans 2016). I
used Representative Fattah’s data as Representative Evans did not cosponsor any of the
43 bills and resolutions I am studying.
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Representative Mark Takai’s seat in Hawaii’s 1st District was left vacant upon his death
in July of 2016 (Diaz 2016) until Representative Colleen Hanabusa was worn in in
November of that year (Colleen Hanabusa 2016). Representative Hanabusa did not
cosponsor any of the pieces of legislation I am studying so I used Representative Takai’s
data.
Representative Ed Whitfield resigned from serving as the Representative Kentucky’s 1st
District in August of 2016 following the report of the House Ethics Committee that found
him guilty of giving special favors to his lobbyist wife (Caygle 2016). Representative
James Comer filled Representative Whitfield’s vacant seat in November of 2016. Like
Representatives Evans and Hanabusa, Representative Comer did not cosponsor any
legislation I am studying, so I used Representative Whitfield’s data.
Lastly, Representative Janice Hahn resigned from her seat in California’s 44th District in
December of 2016 as she was assuming a position on the Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors (Wire 2016). Her seat was left vacant until the end of the 114th Congress, so
I used Representative Hahn’s data.
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LIST OF BILLS IN EACH LEGISLATIVE CATEGORY

PRO-LIFE
H.R. 36
H.R. 217
H.R. 596

H.R. 803
H.R. 940
H.R. 2300
H.R. 3134
H.R. 3197
H.R. 3504
H.R. 4828
H.R. 4924

Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act
Title X Abortion Provider Prohibition Act
To repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and health carerelated provisions in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, and for other purposes
Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act
Health Care Conscience Rights Act
Empowering Patients First Act of 2015
Defund Planned Parenthood Act of 2015
Protecting Life and Taxpayers Act of 2015
Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act
Conscience Protection Act of 2016
Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2016

PRO-CHOICE
H.R. 448
H.R. 2972

Women’s Health Protection Act of 2015
Equal Access to Abortion Coverage in Health Insurance (EACH Woman)
Act of 2015

GAY RIGHTS
H.R. 590
H.R. 915
H.R. 1706
H.R. 2368
H.Res. 208
H.Res. 263
H.Con.Res. 38

International Human Rights Defense Act of 2015
Voices for Veterans Act
Real Education for Healthy Youth Act of 2015
Global Respect Act
Equality for All Resolution of 2015
Supporting the goals and ideals of the International Day Against
Homophobia and Transphobia
Supporting the goals and ideals of the Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education
Network’s (GLSEN) National Day of Silence in bringing attention to antilesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender name-calling, bullying, and
harassment faced by individuals in schools
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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
H.R. 631
H.R. 940
H.R. 1150
H.R. 1299
H.R. 2601
H.R. 2802
H.R. 3185
H.R. 4828
H.R. 3575
H.R. 5207
H.Res 310
H.Res. 343

H.Res. 354
H.Res. 569
H.Con.Res. 75

EACH Act
Health Care Conscience Rights Act
Health Care Conscience Rights Act
Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act of 2015
EACH Act
First Amendment Defense Act
Equality Act
Conscience Protection Act of 2016
Refugee Resettlement Oversight and Security Act of 2015
Freedom of Religion Act of 2016
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding
Srebrenica
Expressing concern regarding persistent and credible reports of
systematic state-sanctioned organ harvesting from non-consenting
prisoners of conscience in the People’s Republic of China, including
from large numbers of Falun Gong practitioners and members of other
religious ethnic minority groups
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the
safety and security of Jewish communities in Europe
Condemning violence, bigotry, and hateful rhetoric towards Muslims in
the United States
Expressing the sense of Congress that the atrocities perpetrated by ISIL
against religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq and Syria include war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide

PRO-REFUGEE
H.Res. 650

Providing for the safety and security of the Iranian dissidents living in
Camp Liberty/Hurriya in Iraq and awaiting the resettlement by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and permitting use of
their own assets to assist in their resettlement

88
ANTI-REFUGEE
H.R. 1148
H.R. 3314
H.R. 3573
H.R. 3999
H.R. 4032
H.R. 4038
H.R. 4247

Michael Davis, Jr. in Honor of State and Local Law Enforcement Act
Resettlement Accountability National Security Act of 2015
Refugee Resettlement Oversight and Security Act of 2015
American SAFE Act of 2015
States’ Right of Refugee Refusal Act of 2015
American Security Against Foreign Enemies Act of 2015
Cuban Immigrant Work Opportunity Act of 2015
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